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FORCED MARRIAGE AND THE 
EXOTICIZATION OF GENDERED HARMS IN 
UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW 
 
This is a pre-publication version which will appear in (2011) 19(3) 
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 
 
JENNI MILLBANK
*
 AND CATHERINE DAUVERGNE
**
  
 
Refugee law scholars and advocates have devoted a great deal of 
attention to gender-related persecution since the 1980s. The Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) first 
contended that gender was a valid basis for refugee claims in 1985 and 
released its original guidelines for the protection of women as refugees in 
1991.
1
 Critical scholarship has focussed on refugee law’s bias towards 
recognition of masculinised experiences and on how its categorizations 
confine women to narrow, victimized identities.
2
 After more than twenty 
years of concerted effort, one might expect to see an increasingly nuanced 
refugee jurisprudence concerning gender. With this in mind, we began a 
study of forced marriage as a basis for refugee claims.
3
   
 While claims of forced marriage or pressure to marry as the, or a, 
main basis of persecution represent only a tiny portion of refugee claims 
overall, they provide an illuminating sliver reflecting the major recurring 
themes in gender and sexuality claims from recent decades. Forced 
marriage is an important case study of gender in refugee law because it 
involves longstanding and unambiguous human rights standards, it arises 
in diverse settings and the harms associated with it take many forms and 
impact differently depending upon the gender and sexuality of those 
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1 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Executive Committee Conclusions, 
Refugee Women and International Protection, § (K) (18 Oct. 1985), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c43a8.html [hereinafter UNHCR, Refugee Women and 
International Protection]; UNHCR, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, U.N. 
Doc ES/SCP/67 (1991), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d4f915e4.html. 
 
2 See, e.g., Deborah Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten no Longer?, 32 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 771 (1995); Deborah Anker, Lauren Gilbert & Nancy Kelly, Women Whose 
Governments are Unable or Unwilling to Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic 
Violence may Qualify as Refugees under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 709 (1997); Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
25 (1998); THOMAS SPIJKERBOER, GENDER AND REFUGEE STATUS (2000); HEAVEN 
CRAWLEY, REFUGEES AND GENDER: LAW AND PROCESS (2001); Karen Musalo & Stephen 
Knight, Steps Forward and Steps Back: Uneven Progress in the Law of Social Group and 
Gender-Based Claims in the United States, 13 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 51 (2001). 
 
3 As this study draws on an international data set, we use the term “refugee,” 
which is defined in international law and is used consistently throughout our case set. The 
term “asylum” is perhaps more common in the United States. 
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involved. Our examination of these cases reveals the profound schism 
between human rights norms and refugee law’s protections.  
 While we acknowledge that there are many valid criticisms to be 
made of international human rights discourse, our analysis in this article 
reflects our belief that meaningful consent to marriage is nevertheless a 
gendered human rights issue of vital importance. We are also aware of 
concern that policymakers and others either completely conflate arranged 
and forced marriage or else pose (consensual) “arranged” and “forced” 
marriages as if they are diametric opposites; whereas consent to all kinds of 
marriages may take place within a continuum of pressure and coercion.
4
 In 
this article we intend “forced marriage” to include any marriage in which 
one or both participants have been deprived of the opportunity of free or 
meaningful consent through threats, including emotional and economic 
threats, pressure or coercion.  Our research has affirmed our understanding 
that refusal to marry is a flashpoint for expressing non-conformity with 
expected gender roles for heterosexual women, lesbians and gay men. We 
proceed from the premise that the state has a role in protecting, and indeed 
a duty to protect, consent to marriage. This role extends to responding to 
claims for assistance from citizens and, in some circumstances, non-
citizens.  
 This paper presents results from our study of 168 refugee decisions 
where part of the claim for refugee protection concerned actual or 
threatened forced marriage. We gathered every decision available in 
English that meets these criteria during the past fifteen years from 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States (the 
“receiving countries”).
5
 In the present discussion, we highlight our findings 
from the cases from the United States (American), while detailed findings 
regarding the broader international data set are published elsewhere.
6
 
While there are notable differences in the cases arising from each receiving 
country we studied, the American cases stand out as a group distinct from 
the rest. We found a marked reticence on behalf of American decision 
makers to grapple with gendered harms in general and forced marriage in 
particular. Where the American cases do analyze harm as gendered, the 
discussions are markedly more focused on exoticized elements, such as 
foreign cultural practices that tend to distance and objectify women, than 
do decisions from other jurisdictions. The American decisions also tend to 
describe such practices in prurient detail. Furthermore, the American cases 
are notably more insular than those from other countries. Among the forty-
eight American decisions in our data set, we did not find a single reference 
to a non-American decision or to an international human rights standard. 
This may be the norm in American refugee law, but it is certainly not the 
global norm and is one of many factors demonstrating that American 
asylum law is alarmingly out of step with developments elsewhere. 
 Our analysis treads a fine line between a temptation to generalize 
and the impossibility of doing so. In the United States and the United 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Sundari Anitha & Aisha Gill, Coercion, Consent and the Forced 
Marriage Debate in the UK, 17 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 165 (2009); Anne Phillips & Moira 
Dustin, UK Initiatives on Forced Marriage: Regulation, Dialogue and Exit, 52 POL. STUD. 
531 (2004). 
 
5 We did not find any decisions fitting these criteria from New Zealand. 
 
6 Catherine Dauvergne & Jenni Millbank, Forced Marriage as Harm in Domestic 
and International Law, 73(1) MOD. L. REV. 57 (2010). 
 
Page | 3 
 
Kingdom in particular, we have access to a very small number of decisions 
compared to the total number of refugee determinations made during this 
time period. Our American analysis is limited especially by scarce access 
to Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decisions. The BIA, the major 
refugee decision making agency in the United States, benefits from 
considerable legislative and judicial deference. Limited access to these 
rulings means a serious lack of transparency in American asylum law. We 
have no reason to believe that the decisions we have found are atypical of 
American jurisprudence generally, as even in this electronic age it remains 
the case that important and leading decisions are reported and that the very 
best and very worst of decisions become well known in advocacy circles, 
but we cannot be certain. We cannot, of course, draw any quantitative 
conclusions about American decision making. We present this analysis for 
what it is: a glimpse of what it is currently possible to know about 
American refugee decisions regarding forced marriage.   
 The aim of this paper is to analyze the American decisions against 
the comparative backdrop of our international data set. We present this 
analysis in four steps. The first section compares recent attention to forced 
marriage as a domestic policy issue in European law with fledgling 
American developments. The second section outlines the framework of 
American asylum law and policy with regard to forced marriage through 
the development of gender analysis guidance documents incorporating 
international human rights standards. This section also explores the failure 
to integrate these standards through case studies of two high-profile cases: 
In re Kasinga in 1996 and Gao v. Gonzales in 2007.
7
 Following this, we 
examine how the key requirements of refugee jurisprudence—persecution, 
particular social group, and nexus—have been approached in the American 
forced marriage cases. Through this examination we compare American 
cases with those from the international data set. Finally, we turn to how 
successful American claims differ (or not) from successful claims 
elsewhere. 
  
I. COMPARING AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN FORCED 
MARRIAGE DEVELOPMENTS IN DOMESTIC 
IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGN POLICY  
Public and political concern over forced marriage emerged in 
Europe in the early 1990s, at least a decade before any interest in this issue 
developed in the United States. The policy trajectory varied in different 
European countries, but in each case it arguably arose from an implicit 
understanding of vulnerable brides as “ours” (nationals or dual nationals), 
while imposed grooms are “theirs” (migrant spouses). This generated an 
intense early focus on immigration restrictions as the “answer” to the 
problem of forced marriage.
8
 This is distinct from the contemporary 
American discourse where, by contrast, forced marriage concerns center 
almost exclusively upon child marriage, an issue which is presented as 
                                                 
7 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA June 13, 1996); Gao v. Gonzales, 440 
F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 
8 The use of immigration restrictions by European countries to address forced 
marriage has been strenuously criticised as anti-Muslim, intertwined with the war on terror 
and unduly punitive of immigrant women. See, e.g., Sherene Razack, Imperiled Muslim 
Women, Dangerous Muslim Men and Civilised Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to 
Forced Marriages, 12 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 129 (2004); Amrit Wilson, The Forced 
Marriage Debate and the British State, 49 RACE & CLASS 25 (2007). 
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being geographically confined to “developing countries.” We will consider 
the importance of this contrast after briefly surveying the European 
developments.    
 Of all European countries, Denmark directed its reform energies 
concerning forced marriage most explicitly and continuously towards 
immigration restriction. Legal changes limiting family reunification 
immigration provisions began in Denmark in 1998 and were tightened 
again in 2000, 2002 and 2004.
9
 The impact of such immigration law 
changes reached far beyond forced marriages, but were justified on the 
basis that the greatest vulnerability was faced by young people with little 
independence from their families who were being coerced into marriages 
with overseas-born, often older, spouses from the same ethnic background. 
Only after most of these restrictive regulations were in place did Denmark 
produce an “Action Plan on Forced, Quasi-Forced and Arrangement 
Marriages” with proposals for broader empowering strategies such as 
counselling, education for teachers and case workers, residential facilities 
and a research program.
10
 In contrast, Norway pursued an inverse 
trajectory, beginning in 1998 with an “Action Plan” that did not focus on 
immigration restriction (indeed it suggested liberalizing immigration 
policies might actually reduce incentives to forced marriage).
11
 The initial 
1998 Norwegian plan focused on education and support for victims. 
Immigration law changes were not introduced in Norway until 2003, and 
were minimal in comparison with Denmark. In the same year, a specific 
criminal provision on forced marriage was introduced in Norway, a move 
replicated by Germany in 2005 and Belgium in 2007.
12
 During the same 
time period, France made several changes to procedural requirements to 
ensure genuine consent for marriage.
13
   
 The United Kingdom provides an interesting example of the 
development of a multifaceted approach shaped by community and 
feminist involvement. While initial action focused on immigration, 
including raising the age requirements for spousal visas, it rapidly moved 
in a number of other directions. Rather than criminalization, the United 
Kingdom created a range of new civil remedies under the Forced Marriage 
(Civil Protection) Act, which passed in 2007 and came into effect in 
December 2008.
14
 The centrepiece of this law is the creation of a “forced 
                                                 
9 Anja Bredal, Tackling Forced Marriage in the Nordic Countries: Between 
Women’s Rights and Immigration Control, in ‘HONOUR’: CRIMES, PARADIGMS AND 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 342–45 (Lynn Welchman & Sara Hossain eds., 2005).   
 
10 THE DANISH GOVERNMENT, THE GOVERNMENT’S ACTION PLAN FOR 2003–2005 
ON FORCED, QUASI-FORCED AND ARRANGED MARRIAGES (2003), available at 
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/05ED3816-8159-4899-9CBBCDD2D7BF23AE/0 
/forced_marriages.pdf. 
 
11 Bredal, supra note 9, at 333–35. 
 
 
12 Brigitte Clark & Claudina Richard, The Prevention and Prohibition of Forced 
Marriages—a Comparative Approach, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 501, 503 (2008). 
 
13 Id. 
 
14 Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, 2007, c. 20 (U.K.). Scotland recently 
introduced similar legislation: see Forced Marriage etc. (Protection and Jurisdiction) 
(Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 53) introduced into Scottish Parliament on 29 September 2010, 
available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/bills/53-forcedMarriage/b53s3-introd-
pm.pdf.  
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marriage protection order” designed to protect a person at risk of forced 
marriage or who has already been forced to marry.
15
 The legislation creates 
a flexible tool and strenuously reinforces a proactive role for the courts in 
confronting and potentially averting forced marriage.  
 A key aspect of the United Kingdom’s approach was the 
establishment in 2005 of the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU), a joint initiative 
of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office. The FMU 
agenda reflects a feminist and community-informed understanding that 
forced marriage is a harm based upon power imbalances concerning gender 
and sexuality. The Forced Marriage Unit information brochure for the 
lesbian and gay community states:  
 
A forced marriage is conducted without the consent of one or 
both people, and pressure or abuse is used. This could include 
both physical pressure (when someone threatens to or actually 
does hurt you) or emotional pressure (for example, when 
someone tries to make you feel that your sexuality brings shame 
on your family) to get married.
16
 
 
Policy initiatives include roles for schools and teachers, health care 
professionals, social workers, police, community organizations and 
individuals in being alert to and responding to situations of forced 
marriage. These initiatives articulate a “protective” role of the state that 
extends to proactive service provisions. A statutory guidance document 
accompanying the new legislation states that in the first nine months of 
2008, 1,300 “instances of suspected forced marriage” were reported to the 
FMU.
17
 In terms of ongoing casework, the FMU reports that it currently 
deals with around 400 cases annually.
18
 The FMU has also developed a 
unique capacity to act overseas to assist Britons and dual citizens facing 
forced marriage. The FMU coordinates with consular staff abroad to 
intervene directly when the unit or consular staff are notified that someone 
is at risk of forced marriage, or has been forced to marry overseas. By 2008 
the unit had reportedly assisted with 180 such cases overseas.
19
  
 What the European initiatives have in common, whether anchored 
in immigration, criminal or family law, is a central concern about forced 
marriages taking place within Europe. The United Kingdom has gone 
further than other states by extending this protective concern beyond its 
citizens to include even individuals who are not citizens and not being 
forcibly married within the United Kingdom, but who are connected to it 
only by a residency right.
20
 Contemporary American concern about forced 
                                                 
15 Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, supra note 14, at pt. 1. 
 
16 FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT (U.K.), GUIDE TO FORCED MARRIAGE FOR LGBT 
PEOPLE 2 (2007), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/foced-marriage-lgbt. 
 
17 HM GOVERNMENT, THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE: MULTI-AGENCY STATUTORY 
GUIDANCE FOR DEALING WITH FORCED MARRIAGE 5 (2008), available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/3849543/forced-marriage-right-to-choose. 
 
18 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Forced Marriage Unit, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/human-rights/forced-marriage-unit (last visited Feb. 
6, 2010). 
 
19 Owen Bowcott & Jenny Percival, Bangladeshi “forced marriage” GP due back 
in Britain tomorrow, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2008. 
 
20 Id. 
Page | 6 
 
marriage starts from precisely the opposite position. Current initiatives in 
the United States are focused on non-citizens located only in so-called 
“developing” countries and affected by a “harmful traditional practice.”
21
 
Considering the shape this issue has taken in the domestic policy of the 
United States illuminates how the understanding of forced marriage has 
been limited, and arguably misunderstood, in American asylum law. 
 There do not appear to be any domestic non-government 
organizations (NGOs) staging campaigns about preventing forced 
marriages within the United States, nor is there an academic literature 
discussing social, political and legal aspects of forced marriage. In 
searching for a domestic discourse about forced marriage within the United 
States, we find a domestic politics of concern about child marriage in 
foreign countries, as well as a strand of anti-trafficking politics which 
considers the linkages between human trafficking and forced marriage, but 
only a few very small recent signs that a broader European-style 
engagement may be on the horizon. 
 Concern in the United States about child marriage has crystallized 
in proposed legislation under the title International Protecting Girls by 
Preventing Child Marriage Act. Parallel bills were introduced into the 
House of Representatives and Senate in the spring of 2009.
22
 The House 
passed its version on 10 June 2009.
23
 The original House and Senate bills 
state in their respective “Findings” sections that “child marriage, also 
known as ‘forced marriage’ or ‘early marriage’ is a harmful traditional 
practice that deprives girls of their dignity and human rights,”
24
 and is 
framed with statistical information regarding child marriage worldwide.
25
  
While girls are named in the bill’s title, child marriage is defined as “the 
marriage of a girl or boy, not yet the minimum age for marriage stipulated 
in law in the country in which the girl or boy is a resident.”
26
 The bill 
authorizes expenditures for a variety of assistance programs aimed at 
reducing and eliminating child marriage and gives priority to areas with a 
high occurrence of child marriage, activities that have proven successful, 
and pilot projects that agree to share their evaluations. This assistance is to 
be coordinated with existing foreign aid initiatives.
27
 The bill would also 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
21 International Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act, H.R. 2103, 
111th Cong. (2009) §2 (introduced Apr. 27, 2009); International Protecting Girls by 
Preventing Child Marriage Act, S. 987, 111th Cong. (2009) §2 (introduced May 6, 2009). 
 
22 H.R. 2103, supra note 21; S. 987, supra note 21. The bills are identical in 
substance but present material in a differing order with the result that section numbers are 
not identical.   
 
23 This was passed as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Years 2010 and 2011, H.R. 2410, 111th Cong. (2009), §1111. In this version of the bill, the 
Findings section is eliminated as are some generalized provisions regarding assistance. All 
specific requirements were carried forward. 
 
24 H.R. 2103, supra note 21, at §2(1); S. 987, supra note 21, at §2(1). 
 
25 Throughout §2, the global prevalence of child marriage is discussed, eleven 
countries in Africa and South Asia are named as particular problem areas, and protection 
against forced marriage in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is cited. H.R. 2103, 
supra note 21, at §2; S. 987, supra note 21, at §2. 
 
26 H.R. 2103, supra note 21, at §8; S. 987, supra note 21, at §3. 
 
27 H.R. 2103, supra note 21, at §4; S. 987, supra note 21, at §5. 
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require the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to develop a multi-year 
strategy for confronting child marriage, to develop research capacity 
surrounding the issue and to include information about child marriage in 
the annual State Department Human Rights Reports.
28
   
 It is unknown at the time of writing whether the Bill will become 
law in the future.
29
 The tenor of the legislation is strikingly at odds with our 
analysis of American asylum decisions in that it is overtly linked to a 
concern over international human rights standards. In part, this disjuncture 
may be because it focuses on a distinct subset of the problem of forced 
marriage. Addressing only child marriage, only developing countries, only 
“traditional practices,” and focusing almost exclusively on girls obviates 
the possibility of the kind of robust and wide-ranging discussion taking 
place in the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent elsewhere in Europe.  
Framed only as an issue of early marriage and the impossibility of consent, 
it excludes discussion of how forced marriage may be used to control non-
conforming sexuality across a broad range of experiences, including adults 
in their twenties, gay men and lesbians and young women choosing 
interracial or religious partners. It also excludes discussion of forced 
marriage in contexts where the practice is sharply modernized (for example 
involving international travel or the theft of the victim’s passport and cell 
phone).
30
 The legislation takes the unnecessary step of pronouncing that 
“child marriage” is also known as “forced marriage,” thus defining away 
all other aspects of forced marriage.
31
 
 The 2009 legislation has its antecedent in a bill co-sponsored by 
then-Senator Hillary Clinton in 2006 under the title “International Child 
Marriage Prevention and Assistance Act of 2006.”
32
 This earlier legislation 
was similar in its focus on foreign aid initiatives for developing countries, 
backed up by strategy development and reporting requirements. The most 
significant difference was its focus on the health risks to girls becoming 
pregnant and giving birth before adulthood.
33
 The bill was introduced by 
Senator Durbin with a speech on maternal mortality rates.
34
 Given this 
                                                 
28 H.R. 2103, supra note 21, at §§5–7; S. 987, supra note 21, at §5–7. 
 
29 On December 1, 2010, Senate passed an amended version of the bill, but upon 
return to the House it was defeated on December 16, 2010.: see International Protecting 
Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act of 2009, S.987, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/legislation.xpd. 
 
30 See, e.g., FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT (U.K.), supra note 16. 
 
31 Although some commentators have made an effort to suggest that the practice 
is not solely “foreign” or “other,” it is the “child” element that is seen to occur within the 
United States, not the “forced” aspect. That is, while there is some limited recognition that a 
significant number of teenagers do marry in the United States, there is not yet any concern 
about forced or coerced marriages occurring “at home.”  See, e.g., Bojana Stoparic, Anti-
Poverty Efforts Face Child Marriage Hurdle, WOMEN’S ENEWS, Aug. 22, 2006, 
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/ dyn/aid/2831. 
 
32 S. 3651, 109th Cong. (2006). This bill was referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and then stalled. The other sponsors were Senators Dick Durbin and 
Chuck Hagel. See id.  
 
33 A specific aim of the bill was to reduce the global incidence of obstetric fistula. 
Id. at §6. 
 
34 Senator Dick Durbin, Remarks introducing the International Child Marriage 
Prevention and Assistance Act of 2006 (Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
cgi-bin/query/R?r109:FLD001:S61684 (follow “MATERNAL MORTALITY--(Senate - 
Dec. 8, 2006)”). 
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concern an exclusive focus on girls was logical. The current version of the 
legislation focuses more directly on marriage itself, but this antecedent 
does help contextualize the emphasis on “child” rather than “forced” 
marriage.  
 The second area where concern about forced marriage arises in 
American discourse is in the domain of human trafficking. The United 
States has staked out a leadership role in the increasingly globalized effort 
to criminalize and eradicate trafficking in persons, and since 2001, the 
State Department has issued an annual Trafficking in Persons Report 
assessing trafficking prevalence and prevention efforts in countries around 
the globe.
35
 Since its earliest edition, this report has included some 
references to women and girls who are trafficked within or across borders 
for the purpose of forcible marriage.
36
 The intensity of the Report’s focus 
on forced marriage has increased somewhat since 2001. Given the very 
high proportion of Chinese asylum claims in the American data set, it is 
apposite to point out that the inaugural 2001 report raised a concern about 
women trafficked into China and through China for the purpose of 
“arranged marriages.”
37
 In contrast to the new and fledgling public 
discourse about child marriage, public and political attention to the issue of 
human trafficking is well established and sustained in the United States.
38
 
Forced marriage does not have a central place in this discourse but it is 
recognized as a related issue of concern. 
 Finally, there are also small snippets of evidence of some 
American policies beginning to reflect awareness of how forced marriage 
may affect American citizens. The 2005 version of the State Department 
Foreign Affairs Manual contains a seven-page chapter addressing forced 
marriage.
39
 This text is distinct from the domestic discourses of child 
marriage and trafficking and has similarities with the activities of the 
British Forced Marriage Unit. Although the chapter is titled “Forced 
Marriage of Minors,” it opens by observing that “[t]he issue of forced 
marriages involves more than just child victims,”
40
 and also states that 
fifteen percent of victims are male. The first paragraph concludes with 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
35 For an overview of this effort, see CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE 
ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALIZATION MEANS FOR MIGRATION AND LAW 69–92 (2008); James 
Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of "Human Trafficking” 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 
(2008). 
 
36 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 
(2010), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/.   
  
37 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 37 (2001). 
 
38 See Hathaway, supra note 35. See also Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a 
Human Rights Violation: the Complex Intersection of Legal Frameworks for 
Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 24 MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 1143 (2003); Janie 
Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human 
Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437 (2006); Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and the New 
UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 975 (2001); Kara Abramson, Beyond Consent, Toward Safeguarding Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations Trafficking Protocol, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 473 
(2003). 
 
39 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL VOLUME 7 – CONSULAR 
AFFAIRS (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86822.pdf. 
 
40 Id. at 1. 
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strong advice to American diplomats: “Cases involving US citizen/national 
children that come to your attention cannot be disregarded, or simply 
referred back to their parents. You must take all possible steps to protect 
the US citizen/national child in these cases.”
41
 
The chapter then sets out the legal authorities both for 
understanding forced marriage as a human rights infringement and for 
supporting consular action; distinguishes forced marriage from arranged 
marriage (a distinction often disregarded in asylum cases);
42
 and outlines 
specific actions to be taken. American diplomats are not empowered to 
confront forced marriage of their citizens as assertively as the British, in 
part because of the authority granted by the United Kingdom’s 2008 
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, but they have nonetheless been 
given unambiguous guidance about the harm of forced marriage.  
 This advice appears to have been taken to heart by only one 
American embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The embassy website has a 
forced marriage page stating: 
The U.S. Embassy in Dhaka is willing to assist victims or 
potential victims of forced marriage.  If you are an American 
citizen in Bangladesh, or know an American citizen in 
Bangladesh, who has been, is being, or fears being forced into 
marriage against your/their will, please contact the U.S. 
Embassy in Dhaka 
43
 
 
The ‘FAQ’ page gives advice to those citizens already in 
Bangladesh, to American citizens yet to travel there and to citizens who 
have already been forcibly married. The page states that some individuals 
may be eligible for loans from the United States government to help them 
return to the United States and also advises, “If possible take a cell phone 
with you, and have the contact number of the U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh 
stored in it.”
44
 The State Department also includes a warning about forced 
marriage as part of its travel advisory for Bangladesh.
45
 While Bangladesh 
                                                 
41 Id. 
 
42 The chapter states:  
  
Arranged marriages have been a long-standing tradition in many cultures 
and countries. The Department respects this tradition, and makes a very 
clear distinction between a forced marriage and an arranged marriage. In 
arranged marriages the families of both spouses take a leading role in 
arranging the marriage but the choice whether to accept the arrangement 
remains with the individuals.   
 
Id. at 3-4. Contra Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801, (2007) 
(No. 06-1264) (see infra pp. 23–26, where forced marriage is repeatedly characterised as 
“arranged.”). 
43 Embassy of the United States: Dhaka, Bangladesh, Forced Marriage 
Homepage, http://dhaka.usembassy.gov/forced_marriage_home.html (last visited Oct 21, 
2010) (emphasis in original).  
 
44 Embassy of the United States: Dhaka, Bangladesh, Forced Marriage FAQ page 
http://dhaka.usembassy.gov/forced_marriage_faq.html 
 
45 U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Consular Affairs, Bangladesh Country 
Specific Information, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1011.html (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2010) (General travel advice regarding forced marriage provides a series of links to 
the United Kingdom Forced Marriage Unit webpages). 
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is defined by the State Department as a developing country, the concern 
about forced marriage is addressed to American citizens with twenty-first 
century sensibilities.   
 In sum, the contrast between American and European approaches 
to forced marriage reveals a sustained, broader and more detailed 
engagement with this issue in Europe.  Within the United States, with the 
exception of some isolated references to the possibility of forced marriage 
of American citizens abroad in diplomatic and consular materials, the issue 
of forced marriage has been subsumed into concerns either about child 
marriage taking place in foreign countries, where age is used as a blunt 
proxy for consent (and where child pregnancy has been an overwhelming 
concern), or about human trafficking with its own strong politic. In this 
context, forced marriage is overwhelmed and fails to emerge as a distinct 
concern worthy of separate analysis and action.   
 In the next section, we outline how gender guidance within refugee 
policy in the United States has developed to acknowledge forced marriage 
as a gendered harm. Yet, through an examination of key cases, we explain 
how this policy guidance has in fact been honored far more in the breach 
than the observance. We explore how female genital mutilation (“FGM”) 
has come to dominate all discussion of gendered persecution in the 
American refugee context to the exclusion of other, less exoticized, forms 
of gendered harms. 
 
II. FORCED MARRIAGE AS A GENDERED HARM IN 
AMERICAN ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY  
 Nation states implement their obligations under the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter “Refugee 
Convention”) differently. At international law, a refugee is someone who: 
 
[O]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
46
 
 
On the basis of this definition, international refugee law provides 
“surrogate” protection for individuals whose country of nationality cannot 
or will not protect them from certain types of harm. It is clear in the 
jurisprudence that states are not required to protect their citizens from 
every breach of an international human rights standard: some breaches 
constitute persecution and others do not.  
 While the United States is similar to the other countries we discuss 
in that it has an onshore adjudication system with limited avenues of 
judicial review from initial administrative decisions, there are several 
unique features. First, the American system is bifurcated with separate 
institutions, processes and evidentiary standards for “affirmative” claims 
(those made proactively by the applicant) and “defensive” claims of 
                                                 
46 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 
189 U.N.T.S. 150, art. 1(a)(2), amended by Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 
31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
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asylum, which are made to withhold deportation proceedings.
47
 Second, 
since 1996 there has been a strict statutory requirement of timeliness, with 
a one-year period for claims to be made and limited exceptions.
48
 This is in 
contrast to many other countries where a time delay may be taken into 
account as adverse to credibility, but does not prevent the claim being 
heard on the merits.
49
 Third, the judicial review structure in the United 
States, which has eleven separate numbered federal courts of appeal not 
bound by each other’s rulings, has generated a distinctly chaotic approach 
to questions of legal interpretation regarding the refugee definition, in 
particular on how to approach gender and the definition of “particular 
social group”.
50
 Further, while the interpretation and application of refugee 
law is highly politicized in all of the countries under discussion,
51
 the 
United States is unique in its heightened deference to the role of the 
Executive in decision-making. So, for example, immigration judges who 
find that an applicant has satisfied the legal standard in an affirmative 
claim for asylum nevertheless have discretion to deny it.
52
 In addition, the 
Attorney General has the power to issue instructions on legal interpretation 
of the relevant provisions and to directly intervene to vacate decisions of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  
 On the whole, we contend that administrative and statutory 
responses to gendered refugee issues in the United States have been marred 
                                                 
47 In an affirmative claim for asylum the applicant must demonstrate the 
Convention standard of a “well founded fear” which must be more than a mere possibility 
but does not need to meet the balance of probabilities. In a defensive or “withholding of 
removal” claim the applicant must show that it is “more likely than not” they will be subject 
to persecution. See Deborah Anker, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 15, 19, 77 
(3rd ed., 1999); THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY (5th ed., 2003). See also Paul 
O’Dwyer, A Well-Founded Fear of Having my Sexual Orientation Asylum Claim Heard in 
the Wrong Court, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185 (2008). 
 
48 See Karen Musalo & Marcelle Rice, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies: The 
Implementation of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 693 
(2008). In our study, see for example, Matter of A-D-A (Bos., MA Immigration Court, Sept. 
19, 2005) (on file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies); Xuan Li Zheng 
v. Ashcroft, No. 02-73656, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 10776 (9th Cir. June 3, 2002). 
 
49 In addition, since 2005, the REAL ID Act includes a statutory power to make 
negative credibility determinations without regard to whether any inconsistency or 
inaccuracy is in fact central to the claim.  REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) 
(2009). 
 
50 See O’Dwyer, supra note 47; Fatma Marouf, The Emerging Importance of 
“Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and its Potential Impact on 
Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47 
(2008). 
 
51 For example, in recent years, as part of a global trend of refugee receiving 
nations narrowing eligibility in on-shore claims, Australia amended its legislation to narrow 
the definition of persecution, while the United Kingdom and Canada included mandatory 
consideration of certain negative credibility factors in their legislation.  See Migration Act 
1958 (Austl.) section 91R; Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act, 
2004 (UK) section 8; Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27 § 106 
(Can.). 
 
52 For one example of the effect of this policy, see the comments in Manani v. 
Filip, No. 08-1530, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1980, at *3 (8th Cir. Jan. 28, 2009). 
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both by delay and a lack of coherence.
53
 In 2001, then Attorney General 
Janet Reno intervened to overturn a 1999 Board of Immigration Appeals 
decision that women facing domestic violence could not form a “particular 
social group” and proposed new regulations for gender-related claims 
under which the case should be decided. When, after six years, these 
regulations had still not been finalized, the Department of Homeland 
Security submitted a brief to the Attorney General stating that “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship” should be 
recognized as a social group and directed that the BIA should decide the 
pending original case on this basis. The regulations still did not eventuate 
and in 2008 the Attorney General took the step of lifting the original stay 
so that the BIA could itself resolve the issue.
54
 A 2009 brief by the 
Department of Homeland Security in another domestic violence refugee 
claim before the BIA, acknowledged the delay of over nine years in 
producing regulations on gender but insisted that the Department had not 
“abandoned” the effort, and stated that its new leadership (installed as a 
result of the Obama Administration) was “considering the best way 
forward.”
55
  
In contrast to this extraordinary period of delay and ambivalence 
over domestic violence specifically and gender more broadly, the statutory 
definition of refugee was amended in 1996 as a result of advocacy by 
conservative Christian groups to specifically deem forced abortion and 
sterilization persecution on the basis of political opinion.
56
 The American 
statute thereby prioritizes these harms over other forms of gendered 
persecution
57
 and receives very high numbers of claims from China as a 
consequence.
58
  
 Our research demonstrates that forced marriage is still not widely 
accepted in American asylum law as a persecutory harm, which may give 
                                                 
53 For background, see Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Steps Forward and 
Steps Back: Uneven Progress in the Law of Social Group and Gender-Based Claims in the 
United States, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 51 (2001). 
 
                54 Matter of RA, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (BIA 2008); see also Gao v. Gonzales, 440 
F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing earlier developments). 
 
55 Supplemental Brief of Department of Homeland Security at 4, n.5, In re L.R. 
(Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716-
asylum-brief.pdf.  While the brief has been lauded as “open[ing] the way for foreign women 
who are victims of severe domestic beatings and sexual abuse to receive asylum in the 
United States,” the brief in fact represents a fairly restrictive approach to domestic violence 
and particular social group. The brief maintains the Administration’s refusal to accept 
gender more broadly as the basis for a refugee claim. Julia Preston, New Policy Permits 
Asylum for Battered Women, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at A1. (LR’s claim ultimately 
succeeded in 2010: see Julia Preston, Asylum Granted to Mexican Woman in Case Setting 
Standard on Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, August 12, 2010). See further discussion under 
“Particular Social Group,” infra note 133. 
 
56 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2009).  See also infra note 101. 
 
57 See Matter of Y-T-L, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (BIA 2003), discussed in Matter of 
A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Attorney Gen. 2008). 
 
58 In 2008 China was the leading country of origin for those receiving grants of 
on-shore asylum (encompassing both affirmative claims and withholding of removal) in the 
United States, comprising a staggering twenty-four percent of protection grants. See Daniel 
Martin & Martin Hoeffer, Dep’t Homeland Sec. & Office Immigr. Stat. Pol’y Directorate, 
Refugees and Asylees: 2008, ANN. FLOW REP., June 2009, at 5, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary 
/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2008.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
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rise to refugee status. This is particularly shocking given that forced 
marriage was explicitly addressed in the 1995 Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”) “Considerations for Asylum Officers 
Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women” (hereafter “the INS Gender 
Guidelines”).
59
 In an introductory overview, the Guidelines note that 
women claimants may face particular forms of harm for “breaching social 
mores” such as “marrying outside of an arranged marriage,”
60
 and later in 
the section on persecution states that forms of harm “that are unique to or 
more commonly befall women” include “sexual abuse, rape, infanticide, 
genital mutilation, forced marriage, slavery, domestic violence and forced 
abortion.”
61
 Additionally, the INS Gender Guidelines state that “the 
evaluation of gender-based claims must be viewed within the framework 
provided by existing international human rights instruments and the 
interpretation of these instruments by international organizations.”
62
  
 The international instruments referenced in the INS Gender 
Guidelines include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (“CEDAW”), while the international organizations and 
interpretations listed include the original UNHCR Gender Guidelines 
(since substantially revised) and the Canadian Gender Guidelines (which 
are notably described as “a model for gender-based asylum 
adjudications”).
63
 Current versions of these latter two documents expressly 
characterize forced marriage as a form of gender-based persecution.
64
 The 
references to more general international law instruments, the UDHR and 
CEDAW, are also significant, as these characterize the choice of whether 
and whom, to marry as a fundamental human right. The requirement that 
marriage be undertaken only with the “free and full consent” of both 
parties first appeared in Article 16(2) of the 1948 UDHR and was later 
incorporated in various other U.N. human rights treaties.
65
 In 1979, 
                                                 
59 Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office Int’l Aff. on Considerations for 
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women to All INS Asylum Office/rs & 
HQASM Coordinators (May 26, 1995), (reprinted in 7(4) INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 700 (1995)) 
[hereinafter INS Gender Guidelines]. 
 
60 Id. at 4. 
 
61 Id. at 9. 
 
62 Id. at 2. 
 
63 Id. at 2. 
 
64 IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, GUIDELINE 4, WOMEN 
REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION §§ A.I.4, B (1996). U.N. 
High Comm’r for Refugees  Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related 
Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 36(vii), U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 
2002) [hereinafter UNHCR, Gender Guidelines] (“Female claimants may also fail to relate 
questions that are about ‘torture’ to the types of harm which they fear (such as rape, sexual 
abuse, female genital mutilation, ‘honour killings’, forced marriage, etc.).”) See also 
UNHCR, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity, ¶¶ 14, 27, 28, (Nov. 21, 2008). 
 
65 The right was reiterated in Article 23(3) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
art. 23(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966 used the more limited language of “free 
consent.” International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 10(1), Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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CEDAW Article 16(1)(b) expanded the language of consent to include 
“[t]he same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only 
with their free and full consent.”
66
  
 The 1995 INS Gender Guidelines formed the basis for the 2001 
INS “Gender Guidelines for Overseas Refugee Processing.” This later 
document restates that forced marriage is a gender-based form of harm 
which may be persecution in refugee law.
67
 In addition, the issue of forced 
marriage is dealt with in detail in training materials for immigration 
officers produced by the INS: the “Gender-Related Claims Training 
Workbook” (“Workbook”).  The 2002 version of the Workbook mentions 
forced marriage on a number of occasions as a form of gender-based 
harm.
68
 The Workbook also reiterates that national Gender Guidelines 
(specifically those of Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Australia),
69
 U.N. Gender Guidelines and the international human rights 
instruments mentioned above are relevant evaluative tools in assessing 
whether harms faced are contrary to international human rights norms. The 
Workbook also expressly references the 1964 U.N. Convention on Consent 
to Marriage, which provides that marriage should be entered with the full 
and free consent of the parties.
70
 The 2006 version of the Workbook 
included for the first time detailed discussion of forced marriage as one of 
the enumerated examples of harms against women.
71
 The 2006 and 2009 
versions of the Workbook state, 
 
Forced marriage violates numerous human rights. It provides 
an arena in which sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, domestic 
violence, forced labor, and slavery often go unnoticed. Women 
in forced marriages may have fewer educational and work 
opportunities and their freedom of movement may be 
restricted. Also, in some cultures, women and girls may be 
subjected to female genital mutilation prior to the forced 
marriage. Additionally, a woman’s attempt to refuse the forced 
marriage may result in abusive and/or harmful treatment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
66 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, art. 16(1)(b), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.  
 
67 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICES [INS], GENDER GUIDELINES FOR 
OVERSEAS REFUGEE PROCESSING 1, 5 (2001), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ 
documents/legal/gender_guidelines/US_DOS_Overseas_Gender_Guidelines.pdf. 
 
68 IMMIGRATION OFFICER ACADEMY, ASYLUM OFFICE BASIC TRAINING COURSE: 
FEMALE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS, PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK 5, 
9, 24 (2002) [hereinafter GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS TRAINING WORKBOOK]. 
 
69 IMMIGRATION APPELLATE AUTHORITY (UK), GENDER ASYLUM GUIDELINES §§ 
1.13, 2.A.24–25(2000). These guidelines operated at a tribunal level, and drew heavily upon 
a model developed in 1998 by the Refugee Women’s Legal Group. REFUGEE WOMEN'S 
LEGAL GROUP, GENDER GUIDELINES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF ASYLUM CLAIMS IN THE 
U.K. (1998). See also DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS 
(AUSTL.), GUIDELINES ON GENDER ISSUES FOR DECISION MAKERS (1996). 
 
70 GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS TRAINING WORKBOOK, supra note 68, at 8, art. 1(1). 
 
71 IMMIGRATION OFFICER ACADEMY, ASYLUM OFFICE BASIC TRAINING COURSE: 
FEMALE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS, PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK 
(2006). The Gao v. Gonzales decision, which had not yet been overturned, is listed as 
required reading. Id. at 1. 
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Forced marriages have been asserted, and may under some 
circumstances qualify, as a form of persecution. . . . The key 
question in determining whether a forced marriage might 
constitute persecution is whether the victim experienced or 
would experience the marriage, or events surrounding the 
marriage, as serious harm.
72
 
 
We endorse this definition of forced marriage and its relationship 
to the violation of women’s human and civil rights. Such an approach is 
entirely in keeping with developing international understandings of forced 
marriage as a gendered harm and given that it is being promulgated in the 
training to every asylum office in the United States, it raises the 
expectation that American asylum cases would be increasingly in comity 
with it. However, we found that there was rarely, if ever, any judicial 
analysis even approaching this level of understanding in the available 
American cases. To the contrary, we found a widespread and continuing 
reluctance to accept forced marriage as the basis for asylum in the United 
States.  
 
A.  From Kasinga to Gao 
 The celebrated case of Kasinga represents the kernel of much that 
has happened in American asylum law relating to forced marriage. Fatin 
(1993) and Kasinga (1996) were two groundbreaking early US cases 
raising gender issues, and it is notable that both of them remain required 
reading in the current version of the Workbook. While Fatin concerned a 
feminist woman from Iran who claimed that she would not comply with 
religious observance and dress requirements,
73
 Kasinga involved a claim 
made by a young woman from Togo, Fauziya Kassindja, that she had been 
forced to marry at the age of seventeen and would be subjected to female 
genital mutilation (“FGM”) prior to the consummation of the marriage.
74
  
 Forced marriage was a critical aspect of Kassindja’s flight from 
Togo; it formed both an independent claim of harm and an integral aspect 
of the FGM claim from the start. As part of her BIA case, Kassindja filed a 
10-page affidavit.
75
 In the first page of this affidavit, she states twice that 
she did not want to marry but that her aunt forced her. On page two, 
Kassindja notes under “Family History” that her father did not support 
coercion in marriage and that all of her four older sisters chose their own 
husbands. On pages four to six under “Marriage,” Kassindja relates on five 
                                                 
72 Id. at 14-15; IMMIGRATION OFFICER ACADEMY, ASYLUM OFFICE BASIC 
TRAINING COURSE: FEMALE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS, 
PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK 15–16 (2009), available at  http://www.uscis.gov/files/ 
article/AOBTC%20Lesson%2026%20Female%20Asylum%20Applications%20and%20Ge
nder-Related %20Claims.pdf.   
 
73 Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).  In that case the court accepted that 
women could form a particular social group but held that the applicant had not proven a 
likelihood of persecution on this basis. Id. at 1240. 
 
74 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996). Kassindja’s name was misspelt 
by the original immigration officer; thus her case name and actual name do not match. 
 
75 Brief for the Respondent at Exhibit A (Affidavit of Fauziya Kasinga), In re 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357  (BIA Dec. 4, 1995), available at  http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/efoia/kasinga.htm. 
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more occasions that she did not want to marry the man her aunt had 
dictated and repeatedly told this to her aunt. She notes that her aunt 
accepted a bride price and arranged a day for the wedding that was kept 
secret from Kassindja. On the day of the wedding, Kassindja refused to 
sign the marriage papers. Marriage and FGM are linked throughout her 
narrative; FGM will happen because it is expected by both the aunt and the 
husband as a requirement of marriage, but also because as a married 
woman Kassindja will not be able to disobey or leave her husband and is 
far less likely to be able to avail herself of state protection.
76
 In the 
“Conclusion” section she states: 
 
Now that I am married, my husband has the right to demand 
that I return to him and that I be circumcised according to 
tradition. The rest of the community will not protect me since a 
husband has a right to say what will happen to his wife. No one 
will do anything now that I am married . . . As a married 
woman in Togo, the only legal place for me is with my 
husband. If I were to try and go somewhere else, the police 
would come and find me. . . . I would be forced to go to a 
husband I did not want and risk my life being circumcised in 
order to be in a marriage that my Aunt made me enter into 
against my wishes.
77
 
 
Forced marriage in this narrative is an integral aspect of the FGM 
claim because it necessitated, as well as guaranteed, imminent FGM. It also 
contributed to a failure of state protection and meant that internal 
relocation was not possible. In addition, forced marriage was clearly 
articulated by Kassindja as a distinct and separate harm to FGM: while the 
forced marriage would result in FGM, it was not the sole harm, nor was it 
the endpoint of the harm. 
 Yet Kassindja’s claim of forced marriage was not addressed at all 
in the immigration judge’s decision (although he did refer to her in the 
passive object form when he stated that she was “committed to marry 
before being circumcised.”
78
). In the BIA decision, the majority notes in 
the opening section, “The Applicant’s Testimony” that “her aunt forced her 
into a polygamous marriage in October 1994, when she was 17.”
79
 In a 
section headed “Background Information: The Asylum Application,” the 
decision also notes that a translated copy of the applicant’s marriage 
certificate, signed by her husband but not by Kassindja herself, was 
attached to the asylum application.
80
 Yet, the issue of forced marriage 
appears only under a heading of “Ancillary Matters” as an “alternate 
claim” that was unnecessary for the BIA to address.   
 Thus, in Kasinga, forced marriage disappeared almost entirely 
from the judicial record as well as from the extensive public discussion and 
academic commentary on the case, all of which centred exclusively upon 
                                                 
76 Id. at 5. 
 
77 Id. at 10. 
 
78 In re Kasinga at *11, A 73 476 694 (Aug. 15, 1995). 
 
79 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 358.  
 
80 Id. at 360. 
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FGM.
81
 This disappearance presaged much of what was to come in 
American asylum law as a multitude of gender-based issues, including 
forced marriage, have been marginalized in place of a major—and we 
suggest, excessive—focus on FGM. Notably, the BIA does not even index 
the terms “gender,” “women,” “domestic violence” or “forced marriage” in 
its Headnote Charts, although FGM is included.
82
 Likewise, on the INS 
website under “Asylum Resources,” there is no document addressing 
gender-based claims under the “Alert Series” and “Question and Answer 
Series,” although there has been a specific document on FGM since 1994.
83
  
 Connie Oxford, in her sociological study of gender-based asylum 
claims in the United States found the erasure of the complex and multiple 
dimensions of women’s experiences of persecution extended beyond the 
realm of the formal legal judgments we discuss here. Oxford undertook 
fieldwork in the early 2000s, comprising observations and interviews with 
a range of service providers and agents in the asylum process, such as 
doctors, psychologists and lawyers. She found that a broad range of agents 
in the asylum process actively encouraged applicants to pursue FGM 
grounds of claim and subordinated, ignored or failed to inquire about other 
forms of gendered harm such as forced marriage and domestic violence.
84
 
 The other significant aspect of the Kasinga decision is that it 
reveals an attempt by the INS to frame issues concerning gender in sharp 
contradistinction to the then-recently released INS Gender Guidelines. The 
INS attempted to put forward a broad “framework of analysis” for FGM 
claims in which it conceded that the risk of involuntary FGM in the future 
could be a form of persecution, but attempted to exclude those who had 
experienced FGM in the past from eligibility for asylum. While the 
majority of the BIA ignored these arguments, focusing instead on the 
                                                 
81 See, e.g., Linda Malone, Beyond Bosnia and In re Kasinga: A Feminist 
Perspective on Recent Developments in Protecting Women from Sexual Violence, 14 B.U. 
INT’L L.J. 319, 329–37 (1996); Connie Ericson, In re Kasinga: An Expansion of the 
Grounds for Asylum for Women, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 671 (1998); Mary Sheridan, In re 
Fauziya Kasinga: The United States has Opened its Doors to Victims of Female Genital 
Mutilation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 433 (1997). The case received extensive coverage in the 
press, commencing with a front page article in the New York Times prior to the BIA 
determination.  See Celia Dugger, Woman’s Plea for Asylum Puts Tribal Ritual on Trial, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1996; Celia Dugger, U.S. Frees African Fleeing Ritual Mutilation, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996; Op.-Ed., Refugees From Mutilation, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1996; 
Celia Dugger, April 21–27; Seeking Asylum From Genital Mutilation, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 28, 
1996; Celia Dugger, Board Hears Asylum Appeal in Genital-Mutilation Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 3, 1996; Celia Dugger, U.S. Grants Asylum to Woman Fleeing Genital Mutilation Rite, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1996; Celia Dugger, The Asylum System Needs Work, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 22, 1996. The INS took the extraordinary step of writing a letter to the editor in 
response.  See David Martin, Letter to the Editor, U.S. Backs Asylum for Mutilation Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1996. 
 
82 See Index to Precedent Volumes 16–24. Likewise in the BIA Headnote Chart, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/headnote_chart.htm (updated as at May 
2009) there is no listing for “gender” or any gender related term under the any of the 
Asylum categories, although FGM has its own topic under Persecution.   
 
83 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Asylum Resources, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vg
nextoid=d2d1e89390b5d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=d2d1e8939
0b5d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD  (last visited April 2, 2010); INS, ALERT SERIES: 
WOMEN: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION  (1994), available at 
www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/alnga94-001(fgm).pdf. 
 
84 Connie Oxford, Protectors and Victims in the Gender Regime of Asylum, 
NWSA J., Fall 2005, at 18, 29–30. 
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elements of the case at hand, the INS “framework” argument was briefly 
touched upon by the concurring opinions. Four aspects of the INS claims 
which emerge from these fleeting references merit discussion.  
 First, the INS arguments were informed by a combination of 
“floodgates fear” and cultural relativism that we see repeated again and 
again in later gender-based claims. Speaking of FGM in particular, the BIA 
notes that, “The [INS] points out that it is ‘estimated that over eighty 
million females have been subjected to FGM.’ It further notes that there is 
‘no indication’ that ‘Congress considered application of [the asylum laws] 
to broad cultural practices of the type involved here.’”
85
 
 The INS Gender Guidelines note on a number of occasions in 
discussing both the issue of persecution and relevant Convention grounds, 
that women may face harm on account of breaching gender-related social 
mores in their country of origin. They quote also with approval the then-
current UNHCR conclusions that women “who face harsh or inhumane 
treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in 
which they live may be considered a particular social group.”
86
 It is clear, 
therefore, that the INS’s own Gender Guidelines considered that ‘broad 
cultural practices’ directed towards the oppression of women were highly 
relevant to, indeed paradigmatic examples of, gendered harm analysis.
87
 
 Second, as part of an overt policy argument that the BIA should 
use the case as precedent to restrict rather than enlarge eligibility, the INS 
contended that human rights norms were not relevant to the analysis of 
persecution of women: 
 
The Service further argues that “the Board’s interpretation 
in this case must assure protection for those most at risk of 
the harms covered by the statute, but it cannot simply grant 
asylum to all who might be subjected to a practice deemed 
objectionable or a violation of a person’s human rights.”
88
 
   
This approach directly contradicts the INS Gender Guidelines 
instruction that “[t]he evaluation of gender-based claims must be viewed 
within the framework provided by existing international human rights 
instruments and the interpretation of those instruments by international 
organizations.”
89
 
 Third, in the words of the BIA, the INS argued that the test for 
persecution should ‘exclude past victims of FGM from asylum eligibility if 
“they consented” to it or “at least acquiesced”, as in the case of a woman 
who experienced FGM as “a small child.”’
90
 (Binary distinctions between 
past and future FGM have continued to plague American cases until very 
                                                 
85 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 370 (Filppu, J., concurring) (citations omitted, 
emphasis added). 
 
86 See INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 59, at 3, 4, 14.   
 
87 See also GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS TRAINING WORKBOOK, supra note 68, at 21 
(“The fact that a practice is widespread, (eg: domestic violence, FGM, rape as part of an 
occupation during war) is not relevant to determining whether the alleged acts constitute 
persecution.”). 
 
88 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 371 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
 
89 See INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 59, at 2. 
 
90 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 371. 
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recently settled by an order of the Attorney General.)
91
 For the purposes of 
our discussion it is extremely troubling that the INS should characterize 
small girls who lack the ability to meaningfully consent or power to resist 
as “acquiescing” to a practice that the INS itself concedes is a human rights 
abuse. In the context of forced marriage claims this would mean that 
children previously subject to marriage before the legal age of consent 
could likewise be characterized as “acquiescing” to it (rather than as a 
priori forced to marry because they lacked the ability to consent). 
 Finally, American law conclusively bars those who themselves 
have been persecutors from claiming asylum. The INS argued in Kasinga 
that it would be, “[A]nomalous if persons facing death in their homelands 
because of religious or political persecution were denied protection . . . 
simply by virtue of being parents of FGM victims and having followed 
tribal custom.”
92
  
 In making this argument the INS implicitly posited a hierarchy of 
refugee protection in which the real grounds of claim (religious or 
political) and real forms of persecution (death) were being mistakenly 
transplanted by considering a “custom” or “broad cultural practice” 
enforced by non-state actors to be persecution. In this discursive twist we 
must worry about the consequences of legal developments in gender-
related asylum law for family members who are persecutors, as it is they 
who are actually the rightful victims.  
 At the time Kasinga was decided, the INS Gender Guidelines had 
been publicly available for one year, were required reading for all 
interviewing and supervising asylum officers and had been included in 
training materials. In one of the two concurring opinions in Kasinga, Judge 
Rosenberg noted with considerable understatement the “curious” fact that 
the INS made no reference to its own published gender guidance in its 
arguments. It is even more disturbing that, eleven years after Kasinga was 
decided and twelve years after the promulgation of the Gender Guidelines, 
American government lawyers were still making many of the arguments 
outlined above in their Supreme Court petition for certiorari to overturn the 
strongest judicial statement on asylum and forced marriage to date: the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Gao.  
 In Gao, a young woman from China, Hong Yin Gao, had been 
promised in marriage in exchange for a bride price. The immigration judge 
in 2003 characterized this as a “family dispute” (because Gao’s mother 
“violated the oral contract” with the groom) and held that there was no 
particular social group.
93
 This finding was summarily affirmed by the BIA 
in 2004.
94
 In 2006 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the 
relevant social group was “women who have been sold into marriage 
(whether or not that marriage has yet taken place) and who live in a part of 
China where forced marriages are considered valid and enforceable.”
95
  
                                                 
91 Matter of A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Attorney Gen., 2008), The case overruled 
In re A-T, in which the applicant had undergone FGM in the past but feared future 
marriage—the BIA ignored the marriage and had found that persecution was past only as 
FGM could not be repeated. 24 I. & N. Dec. 296 (BIA 2007). 
 
92 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 373, n.2. 
 
93 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *25, Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007) 
(No. 06-1264), 2007 WL 835007. (2d Cir. March 16, 2007). 
 
94 Id. 
 
95 Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d at 70. 
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The court also held that “lifelong involuntary marriage” was a form of 
persecution.
96
 In 2007 the Attorney General’s petition to the Supreme 
Court commenced by characterising the Second Circuit decision as, 
“[E]stablishing a novel and potentially sweeping interpretation of the INA 
that could have far-reaching implications for the Executive Branch’s 
enforcement of immigration law in the highly sensitive context of 
culturally diverse approaches to marriage. 
97
 
The Attorney General’s petition went on to reiterate various 
permutations of floodgates and cultural relativism arguments, for example 
that “60% of all marriages worldwide and 96% of marriages in India, are 
arranged on terms that are often similar” to those in Gao,
98
 and that they 
reflect “broad cultural and religious acceptance” in the countries of 
origin.
99
 Like the eighty million women potentially subject to FGM, the 
sixty percent of women in arranged marriages evoke a veritable tidal wave 
of claimants, which must be held at bay by stringent immigration 
control.
100
 Yet on-shore claims by women have always represented a 
minority of asylum claims in the United States
101
 (as elsewhere) and many 
of these claims will not, of course, involve gender-related persecution.
102
 
 As in Kasinga, the government’s position on “consent” is 
extremely problematic.  In Gao, the fact that arranged marriage involving 
the payment of a bride price was a common practice to which the applicant 
did not object in principle (rather, she did not want to marry the chosen 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
96 Id. 
 
97 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *3, Keisler, 552 U.S. 801(No. 06-1264). For 
repeated references to the “sweeping” and “novel” approach of the court, see generally 
Reply Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler, 552 U.S. 801 (No. 01-1264). 
 
98 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler, 552 U.S. 801 at *3, *19 (No. 06-
1264). 
 
99 Id. at *21 (emphasis added). See also the references to “consistent with cultural 
tradition” at *17, sensitive “cultural questions” of “marriage traditions and practices . . . 
worldwide” at *19, “long-standing tradition in many cultures and countries” at *20,  and the 
“deep roots of such practices in the cultures and religions of a number of foreign nations” at 
*22. This may be contrasted with the position stated on the website of the American 
Embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which reads: “Forced marriages are not the same as 
arranged marriages.   Arranged marriages are a part of many cultural traditions and involve 
the free and full consent of both parties.  Some people, however, find themselves compelled 
to marry against their will, either in the United States or overseas.   This is called a forced 
marriage, and it is a human rights concern, as human rights principles seek to advance the 
freedom and inherent dignity of each individual.” Embassy of the United States: Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, supra note 43.  
 
100  Connie Oxford finds in her study that domestic violence asylum claims 
frequently invoked floodgates discourse from Immigration judges, despite their numerical 
infrequency. Oxford, supra note 84, at 23. 
 
101 Connie Oxford cites unpublished INS figures on affirmative claims by sex for 
the years 1998–2002 in which women make up approximately one third of claims.  Connie 
Oxford, Gender-based Persecution in Asylum Law and Policy in the United States 20 
(2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pittsburgh), (on file with authors). 
 
102 Id. at 46–48 (regarding the difficulty in the American context of obtaining 
precise data regarding the number of gender-related persecution claims). Although this was 
expressly acknowledged in a recent brief by the Department of Homeland Security in a 
refugee case concerning domestic violence. See Supplemental Brief of Department of 
Homeland Security, supra note 55, at 13–14 n. 10 (demonstrating that the Department still 
defined the gendered group as narrowly as possible).  
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groom in particular) led the Attorney General to characterize the case as a 
broken engagement, involving merely a “private dispute” between two 
families
103
 and, breathtakingly, as a contract dispute.
104
 In other contexts, 
the United States government would characterize the payment of money to 
others for possession of women as slavery, sexual slavery and/or 
trafficking—all of which are both domestic and international crimes.
105
  
 Lastly, the Attorney General’s position in Gao continues to re-
order persecutors as victims, restating the argument from Kasinga that a 
finding of persecution based on this “cultural practice” would exclude 
those who participated in it from obtaining asylum under American law, 
“thereby potentially barring thousands of persons—parents, relatives, and 
matchmakers . . . from obtaining asylum, regardless of the severity of 
persecution they might face.”
106
  
 Because the Supreme Court reversed and remanded Gao on the 
narrow basis that the Appeals Court ought not have reformulated the 
protected social group itself (but rather remitted to the BIA to do so), none 
of these arguments were ultimately addressed. What is troubling in both 
Kasinga and Gao is their revelation of the commitment at such high levels 
of the immigration executive in the United States to a long-term strategy of 
undermining, even openly violating, their own gender guidance. 
   
III. THE REFUGEE CASES  
In total we identified forty-eight American cases where forced 
marriage was articulated as part of a claim to asylum or withholding of 
deportation covering the period 1994 to 2008 (inclusive).
107
 In our analysis 
                                                 
103 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 at 21 (2007) 
(No. 06-1264). 
 
104 Id. at *15, *17, *22. 
 
105 See, e.g., Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 62d plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (2001), (ratified by the United States on Nov. 3, 2005);  
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery, Apr. 30, 1957, 226 U.N.T.S. 3 (ratified by the United 
States on Dec. 6, 1967). The United States has also passed numerous acts to prevent 
trafficking both domestically and internationally. See, e.g., Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18, 22, 27, 42 U.S.C.), the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1595, 22 U.S.C. 7109(a) (2003), the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558, (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 42 U.S.C.), and the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat 5044 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 6, 8, 18, 22, 28, 42 U.S.C.). They have also established the President’s 
Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. U.S. Department of 
State, The President's Interagency Task Force To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in 
Persons, Senior Policy Operating Group, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/2009/120224.htm 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2010). Within the Department of State there is the Office to Monitor 
and Combat Trafficking in Persons. U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and 
Combat Trafficking in Persons, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
 
106 Reply Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *8, Keisler, 552 U.S. 801, at 
*8 (2007) (No. 01-1264); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *21, Keisler v. Gao, 
552 U.S. 801 (2007) (No. 06-1264). 
 
107 As with the broader study, the search terms used were “forced marriage,” 
“forced to marry,” and “pressure to marry.” In the United States, the databases used were 
LEXIS and Westlaw, with searches also made of the BIA Precedent Decisions and the 
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we compare the American cases with findings from a previous study of all 
available administrative tribunal and court refugee determinations from the 
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia on forced marriage (“the 
international data set”).
108
 Success rates of claims, while drawn from only a 
partial case set and based upon small numbers of claims, provide a rough 
benchmark from which to start.
109
 The overall positive rate in the United 
States decisions was thirty-one percent, almost identical to our findings of 
a thirty-two percent positive rate from the international data set.
110
   
 In addition to unique features of the American system noted 
earlier, there are several other factors, which warrant caution in drawing 
direct comparisons between the United States and other countries.  Like the 
international data set, the claims made in the United States are diverse and 
arise from a wide range of different countries of origin (fourteen in total). 
Only four countries—Mali, Nigeria, India and China—gave rise to more 
than one claim in the United States.
111
 However, unlike the international 
data set, the United States evinced a massive concentration of cases arising 
from just one country. Thirty of the American cases (or 63%) arose from 
China, a country of origin, which did not feature heavily in the decisions of 
any of the other receiving countries in the international data set.
112
 This 
reflects the high numbers of on-shore claims from China in the United 
States generally as well as the high proportion of claims in which forced 
sterilization and abortion were raised by virtue of their specific statutory 
inclusion in the United States refugee definition. We found that claims of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hastings Center for Gender and Refugee Studies collections. A small number of 2009 cases 
are referred to in discussion but not included in statistical analysis as we were not able to 
gather cases for the entire year and the international data ended at December 2008. In the 
international data set, Australian cases were all obtained from the Austlii case database 
(www.austlii.edu.au). United Kingdom cases were obtained from the Electronic 
Immigration Network case database (www.ein.org.uk), the Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal website (www.ait.gov.uk), LEXIS, Bailii (http://www.bailii.org) and U.N. 
RefWorld databases. Canadian cases were obtained from the QuickLaw, Canlii 
(www.canlii.org) and LEXIS databases.   
 
108 The international data set comprised 120 decisions in total, made up of sixty-
nine decisions from Australia, forty from Canada and a mere eleven from the United 
Kingdom. 
  
109 We count “positive” or “negative” decisions from the perspective of the 
applicant, even if (as in the case of judicial review) the decision is one of remittal and 
reconsideration of the claim rather than an ultimate positive determination of refugee status. 
In general this gives an inflated sense of “positive” outcomes, as we do not have access to 
the majority of the remittal determinations and some, perhaps many, of these will ultimately 
be negative to the applicant. When the cases are disproportionately made up of judicial 
review decisions, as in the United States, the positive figure is likely to be even less 
representative of substantive results. 
 
110 These figures mask significant divergence across the receiving nations, with 
the positive rate forty-three percent in Canada and twenty-six percent in Australia. In the 
United Kingdom, of only eleven decisions, three were positive but two of these were in fact 
remittals. 
 
111 The other countries of origin are Kosovo, Cameroon, Guinea, Iran, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Pakistan, Philippines, Togo and Zambia. Some countries had more than one 
available decision but these arose from the same claimant at different levels of the appellate 
system. 
 
112 In fact, there were only four claims from China in the international data set, 
one of which was successful. The top five countries of origin in the international data set 
were Bangladesh, Nigeria, India, Iran and Ghana. 
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forced marriage appeared alongside those of coercive reproductive policies 
more broadly in a number of cases from China, and that these claims were 
more likely to demonstrate changed grounds through the process and to be 
dismissed on the basis of negative credibility as a result. It also appears that 
the high profile case of Gao (until overturned a year later, led to a spike of 
similar claims.
113
   
 It should also be noted that the American case set was very heavily 
dominated by Court of Appeals decisions,
114
 with only two BIA decisions 
and six immigration judge decisions available. This gives an artificially 
high sense of success rates for forced marriage claims in the United States 
because positive court decisions do not result in a grant of asylum but 
rather to a remittal of the case back to the BIA, which may then again 
refuse asylum.
115
 Moreover, some of the positive court decisions were 
made on a basis other than the forced marriage claim.
116
 In addition, the 
high proportion of appellate decisions meant that the BIA’s approach to 
these issues was often not made clear.
117
 Elsewhere we have focused on 
lower-level administrative tribunals for the very reason that this is where 
the vast bulk of decision-making occurs in refugee law.  
 Another significant difference with the American cases was that 
there were none in which a forced marriage claim was brought by a lesbian 
or gay man.  Rather, all forty-eight claims concerned people who were, or 
were presumed to be, heterosexual: forty-five claims were brought by 
women, one claim was brought jointly by a woman with her male partner 
and two were brought solely by men (both of which failed). This stands in 
striking contrast to the international data set, where forty percent of the 
claims concerned gay or lesbian applicants.
118
 In the international data set, 
forced marriage claims by gay men and lesbians were important in raising 
the intersection of gender and sexuality norms, although these connections 
were not always (or even often) received and analysed in a particularly 
sophisticated manner. However, in the United States, the complete absence 
                                                 
113 More than half of the claims from China are post-Gao and several feature 
strong factual similarities. 
 
114 Thirty-nine of the forty-eight decisions (or eighty-one percent of the decision 
pool) were appellate court judgments. In the international data set the proportion of 
appellate court decisions was only thirty-eight percent. 
 
115 Of a total of fifteen positive decisions, eleven were from the Court of Appeals, 
meaning that only four of the positive decisions definitely led to a grant of asylum or 
withholding of removal. 
 
116 Of the eleven positive decisions at court level, three were on another basis 
(such as failure to consider the consequences on return of the applicant’s illegal departure or 
changed circumstances in the country of origin). 
 
117 It is also possible that many claims of forced marriage at early levels are 
simply “lost” from the record if they were unsuccessful and not reiterated at higher levels. 
 
118 In the international data set there were fifty-eight percent heterosexual women, 
thirty-two percent gay men, eight percent lesbians, and two percent heterosexual men. This 
led to significant differences in the way that claims were framed and received. Marriage 
itself was usually the central feature of heterosexual women’s claims, whereas it was often a 
more minor or cumulative part of a claim brought by lesbians and gay men. The lesbian 
cases were roughly divided, with slightly more than half of them featuring actual forced 
marriage or a specific threat such that forced marriage was central to the claim in a manner 
akin to the heterosexual women’s cases, while the other half were more similar to the gay 
men’s claims in that homophobically motivated persecution was the core element of a claim 
in which marriage was a general threat or more tangential aspect. 
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of a sexual orientation dimension in the marriage cases meant that 
“gender” was generally seen by decision-makers as concerning only 
women.
119
  
 
A. Particular Social Group  
While claims of forced marriage, like other gender-related claims, 
could be brought on the basis of the religious or political opinion (or 
imputed political opinion) grounds, overwhelmingly they are framed on the 
particular social group ground.
120
 We found that the definition of particular 
social group was a major stumbling block in the American cases. It was 
clear from the often scant reasons in at least eighteen cases—representing 
nearly forty percent of the available American case pool—that the 
Immigration Judge had held at first instance that there was no relevant 
Convention ground for women fleeing forced marriage.
121
  Alarmingly, in 
a number of cases decision-makers appear to have summarily drawn this 
conclusion without any written analysis or formulation of the various 
possible particular social groups.
122
 At the level of judicial review, courts 
generally did not engage with the original immigration judge or BIA 
failure to define a social group if there was any other basis upon which to 
uphold the original decision.
123
 The effect of the Supreme Court decision in 
                                                 
119 See also Oxford, supra note 101, at 147–51. 
 
120 The United States, like the United Kingdom and Australia, generally rejected 
gender-based claims as related to either the religious or political opinion grounds when such 
claims were occasionally made. In contrast, Canadian decision-makers frequently 
characterized forced marriage claims as engaging the religious or political ground under the 
Convention in addition to particular social group. 
 
121 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801, app. C at *25 
(2007) (No. 06-1264); Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, vacated sub nom. Keisler v. Gao, 552 
U.S. 801 (2007); Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2008) (remanded on this 
basis); In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296 (BIA 2007); Berishaj v. Gonzalez, 238 F.App’x 57 
(6th Cir. 2007); Xiu Yun Chen v. Gonzalez, 229 F.App’x 413 (7th Cir. 2007); Yan Dan Li 
v. Gonzalez, 222 F.App’x 318 (4th Cir. 2007); Hua Lin v. Gonzalez, 205 F.App’x 879 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Yi Meng Tang v. Gonzalez, 200 F. App’x 68 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanded on this 
basis); Chun Hua Weng v. Gonzalez, 185 F.App’x 77 (2d Cir. 2006); Himanje v. Gonzalez, 
184 F.App’x 105 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanded on this basis); Lan Zhu Pan v. Gonzalez, 445 
F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2006); Keita v. Gonzalez, 175 F. App’x 711 (6th Cir. 2006); Xue Qin Li v. 
B.I.A., 172 F.App’x 385 (2d Cir. 2006); Li Qun Chen v. Gonzalez, 153 F.App’x 49 (2d Cir. 
2005); Matter of S L (N.Y.C., NY Immigration Court, Oct. 7, 1999, copy on file with 
authors); Jin Chao Zheng v. Gonzales, 236 F.App’x 726 (2d Cir. 2007); Xiao Feng Lin v. 
Attorney General, 249 F.App’x 281 (3d Cir. 2007); Xiu Xia Huang v. Attorney Gen., 286 
F.App’x 604 (11th Cir. 2008). In Lan Chen v. Gonzalez, it was unclear whether forced 
marriage was articulated at first instance as part of political opinion claim or whether that 
was entirely separate. 187 F.App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2006). In Xiao Feng Lin v. Attorney Gen., 
the BIA found social group to be a problem, overruling an immigration judge finding that 
the claim was frivolous. 249 F.App’x 281 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
122 See, e.g., Lizhu Chen v. BIA, 238 Fed.App’x 669 (2d Cir. 2007); Keita v. 
Gonzalez, 2006 US App. LEXIS 9484 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2006); Li Qun Chen v. Gonzalez, 
153 Fed.App’x. 49 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 
123 See, e.g., Berishaj v. Gonzalez, 238 Fed.App’x 57 (6th Cir. 2007); Xiu Yun 
Chen v. Gonzalez, 229 Fed.App’x 413 (7th Cir. 2007); Yan Dan Li v. Gonzalez, 222 
Fed.App’x. 318 (4th Cir. 2007); Lan Zhu Pan v. Gonzalez, 445 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2006); Xiu 
Xia Huang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 286 Fed.App’x 604 (11th Cir. 2008). This was so even when, 
arguably, the findings on matters such as likelihood of persecution and the question of the 
nexus of persecution to the particular social group rested upon and therefore required first a 
finding of what the social group actually was. See, e.g., Lan Zhu Pan v. Gonzalez, 445 F.3d 
60 (1st Cir. 2006); Ying Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 319 Fed.App’x 777 (11th Cir. 2009). 
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Gao is that a complete failure to define the particular social group or a 
clear error in defining it will, at most, lead to the case being remitted to the 
BIA, as the Court is not permitted to formulate the appropriate group. This 
lack of judicial guidance on social group formulation is really regrettable, 
most especially because the reasoning on particular social group in the 
available American cases was dramatically worse than the other countries 
examined in this study.  
 Canada has accepted gender-based grounds for refugee claims, 
including forced marriage, from the mid-1990s and not a single Canadian 
claim by a female applicant in our study was rejected on the basis of a lack 
of social group. In the Canadian cases, the group was framed variously as 
“women,”
124
 “women who refuse to follow traditional practices”
125
 and 
“women regarded as chattels.”
126
 The issue of particular social group was 
more contentious in Australia, although this diminished following the High 
Court gender and domestic violence decision Khawar in 2000.
127
 Although 
in the United Kingdom the House of Lords addressed gender and particular 
social group in 1999 in Shah and Islam,
128
 early level decision makers in 
the United Kingdom continued to hold at first instance that there was no 
applicable social group for women fleeing forced marriage through the 
early to mid-2000s. Moreover, the Home Office pursued this argument 
through the appellate process.
129
 Yet, even in comparison to the United 
Kingdom, on the issue of particular social groups the United States was 
and remains the most stagnant, least coherent and most out of step with 
international developments. 
 The early BIA approach of defining a particular social group as a 
group which is bound together by common characteristics which are either 
innate or so fundamental that they ought not be changed,
130
 as later refined 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward,
131
 is now one that is widely 
accepted internationally as well as in the United States.
132
 However, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
124 X. v. Canada, 2001 CanLII 26862 (Immigration & Refugee Bd.). 
 
125 Re X., 2002 CanLII 52705 (Immigration & Refugee Bd.) at *3. 
 
126 This was the tribunal’s own formulation. Re X., 2000 CanLII 21420 
(Immigration & Refugee Bd.) at *3. 
 
127 Min. for Immigration  v. Khawar (2002) 210 C.L.R 1 (Austl.). In our study, 
heterosexual women claiming forced marriage had a positive rate of only eleven percent in 
Australia prior to Khawar, compared to a thirty-eight percent positive rate subsequently. 
 
128 Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (U.K.). 
 
129 This argument has been pursued to the extent of appealing positive decisions 
by adjudicators. See RG (Eth.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, (2006) EWCA (Civ), 
339 (Apr. 4, 2006) (Eng.). 
 
130 “The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship 
ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military 
leadership or land ownership . . . Whatever the common characteristic that defines the 
group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be 
required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or conscience.”  In 
re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). 
 
131 Attorney Gen. v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.). 
 
132 For an overview of international approaches, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of 
“Membership of a Particular Social Group”, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
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BIA and various federal courts of appeal have added their own “glosses” or 
additional elements to the widely accepted “innate or fundamental 
characteristics” approach. These include the additional requirements of 
“cohesion” or “voluntary association” among the group by the large and 
influential Ninth Circuit (an approach emphatically rejected by all of the 
other countries in the international data set and by UNHCR
133
) and, more 
commonly, requiring external “social visibility” of the group.
134
 American 
decision makers have consistently rejected broad formulations of social 
group such as “women” and “young women from rural China”
135
 for the 
above reasons. In a 2005 immigration judge decision, the claim of 
membership of the much narrower “social group of Guinean Fulani women 
who oppose forced, arranged marriages” was also rejected on the basis 
that: 
 
[t]he respondent has presented no evidence indicating that 
women who oppose forced marriage are a cognizable social 
group within Guinean Fulani society . . . The respondent did 
not enter into any voluntary associations based on her 
opposition to forced marriage, nor did she demonstrate that her 
abuser viewed her as a member of any such group.
136
 
 
Significantly, this analysis addressed only the two additional 
“glosses” and not the core test of whether such women possessed an innate 
or fundamental characteristic. 
 Similar formulations such as “young Bambara women who oppose 
arranged marriage”
137
 were commonly rejected on the basis that the group 
was not socially visible.
138
 Both the continued adhesion to a separate 
requirement of social visibility or perception
139
 and the interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                        
LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (Erika Feller, 
Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003). 
 
133 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 
2: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 15, U.N. 
Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR, Guidelines on Particular Social 
Group]. The Ninth Circuit was the only circuit to require a “voluntary associational 
relationship.” Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).  In Hernandez-
Montiel v. INS, the Ninth Circuit retreated from this position and held that a particular social 
group is one united by an innate characteristic or by a voluntary association. 225 F.3d 1084 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
     
134 See Aleinikoff, supra note 132; Marouf, supra note 50. More recently the BIA 
has formulated this as a question of “particularity” requiring recognition by society as “a 
discrete class of persons.” Matter of S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 594 (BIA 2008). 
 
135 Lan Zhu Pan v. Alberto Gonzalez, 445 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 
136 Matter of A-D-A (Bos., MA Immigration Court, Sept. 19, 2005) at *13 (on file 
with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies). 
 
137 In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 303 (BIA 2007), vacated on other grounds by 
In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Attorney Gen. 2008). 
 
138 See Matter of S L (N.Y.C., NY Immigration Court, Oct. 7, 1999) (rejecting the 
application on the basis that there was not a cohesive group with voluntary association) (on 
file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies). 
 
139 Note that the Department of Homeland Security reaffirmed these requirements 
in its recent brief supporting domestic violence as the basis of a refugee claim. See 
Supplemental Brief of Department of Homeland Security, supra note 55. The Department’s 
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this requirement are at odds with UNHCR Guidelines. In its 2003 
Guidelines on Particular Social Group, UNHCR notes both the “innate or 
fundamental characteristic” approaches and the “social perception” 
approaches to group analysis, and formulates them as alternatives to each 
other rather than as additional requirements in framing a social group.
140
 
Moreover, UNHCR has repeatedly stated that the broad social group of 
“women in X country” should satisfy both bases.
141
   
 In common with international standards, the United States requires 
that a particular social group cannot be solely defined by reference to the 
persecution. This offers additional challenges when the group is narrowly 
defined. So, for example, a group formulated as “women in Iran who are 
forced by their fathers to marry” is unacceptable because the defining 
characteristic of the group is the persecution they face. Yet, persecution 
may still be considered as a relevant factor in the group definition if it is 
not the exclusive factor in defining the group.
142
 It was clear in our study 
that Canada took a less strict approach to this issue than the United 
Kingdom or Australia, while the issue was particularly difficult in the 
United States because of the widespread rejection of broader formulations 
of particular social groups on the basis that they were not socially visible or 
not likely to be singled out for persecution. This meant that applicants and 
their advisors in the United States struggled for narrower formulations, 
                                                                                                                                                        
proposed formulations of the particular social group in that brief (“Mexican women in 
domestic relationships who are unable to leave” or “Mexican women who are viewed as 
property by virtue of their position within a domestic relationship”) are as circular as the 
proposed particular social group rejected by the Department (“Mexican women in an 
abusive relationship who are unable to leave”) in terms of the role of persecution in defining 
the group, discussed below, and moreover requires a similar degree of contortion to 
characterize them as socially visible, distinct and cognizable groups. Id. at 10–15 
(discussing the Department’s view of the different proposed particular social groups). 
Surely the reason that women are viewed as property within domestic relationships or are 
unable to leave relationships is because women generally are disempowered in both social 
and legal terms in the society in question: thus the appropriate particular social group should 
simply be “women in Mexico.” 
 
140 UNHCR, Guidelines on Particular Social Group, supra note 133, at ¶¶ 10–12; 
UNHCR, Gender Guidelines, supra note 64, at ¶ 29. It is ironic that the social perception 
approach reached its zenith in Applicant A v. Australia, rejecting Chinese facing forced 
sterilization as a particular social group, while the United States entrenched the social 
visibility approach at the same time that it prioritised this particular experience of 
persecution above others through defining it as a basis for asylum in statute. (1997) 190 
C.L.R. 225; see also supra note 53. 
 
141 UNHCR, Guidelines on Particular Social Group, supra note 133, ¶¶ 7, 12, 18; 
UNHCR, Gender Guidelines, supra note 64, ¶ 30.  As noted by the Third Circuit in 1993 in 
Fatin, “The phrase ‘particular social group’ was first placed in the INA when Congress 
enacted the Refugee Act of 1980. Pub.L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). While the 
legislative history of this act does not reveal what, if any, specific meaning the members of 
Congress attached to the phrase ‘particular social group,’ the legislative history does make 
clear that Congress intended ‘to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 
No. 6577, to which the United States acceded in 1968.’”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 
(3rd Cir. 1993). Relevant contemporary international guidance is relevant to whether in fact 
such conformity is being achieved in accordance with the original legislative intent. 
 
142 UNHCR Guidelines on Particular Social Group note that if the social visibility 
approach is used, as it is in the United States, “persecutory actions towards a group may be 
a relevant factor in determining the visibility of a group in a particular society.” UNHCR, 
Guidelines on Particular Social Group, supra note 133, ¶ 14. 
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which were then in danger of being rejected on the basis that the group was 
solely defined by the persecution.
143
  
 The case of Elizabeth Ngengwe illustrates this dangerous 
balancing act between narrow and broad formulations of the social group. 
Ngengwe claimed that she was subject to persecution as a widow by her 
husband’s family following his death. The family had demanded that she 
marry one of her deceased husband’s brothers (levirate marriage) or repay 
a bride price that her family had received on her original marriage. In 2003, 
before the immigration judge, Ngengwe offered both broader 
(“Cameroonian widows” or “widowed females who are forced into 
marriage because of tradition or cultural values in Cameroon”) and 
narrower formulations of the group (“widowed females who are falsely 
accused of killing their husbands because they are not from the same 
tribe.”
144
) Despite the fact that there was a State Department Country 
Report in evidence which indicated that as a matter of customary law, 
widowed women in Cameroon were required by force to marry one of the 
deceased’s brothers,
145
 the government contended before the Immigration 
Judge that widowed women facing forced marriage was “too broad a 
category to be cognizable as a particular social group” under the Act.
146
 
The government also contended that the characteristics of this group were 
not innate or immutable, as the applicant had “the power to change” by 
either marrying or paying back the bride price. The immigration judge 
accepted all of these arguments.
147
 In addition, the immigration judge 
found that the broadest formation of “widows” was not sufficiently 
homogenous to be cognizable as a group and rejected the narrower 
formulation of “widows facing forced marriage” because it defined the 
group by reference to the persecution. The immigration judge also rejected 
the narrowest group on the basis that this amounted to “simply a widowed 
female, who is disliked by her in-laws” and was therefore merely 
personal.
148
 The BIA affirmed this on review. However, on appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit held that it was an error to reject the broadest formulation of 
                                                 
143 So, for example, the proposed particular social group “young women 
threatened with imprisonment for failing to oblige the demands of a government official to 
marry his relation” was rejected on this basis.  Xiao Feng Lin v. Attorney General, 249 
F.App’x 281 (3rd Cir. 2007). 
 
144 See Matter of E S N (Kan. City, MO Immigration Court, Jan. 14, 2003) at *8 
(on file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies). On appeal the Eighth 
Circuit expressed these somewhat differently, as “Cameroonian widows” and “widowed 
Cameroonian female member[s] of the Bamileke tribe, in the Southern region that [belong] 
to a family or [have] in-laws from a different tribe and region, the Bikom tribe in the 
Northwest province, who have falsely accused [them] of causing [their husbands’] death.”  
Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 
145 Matter of E S N (Kan. City, MO Immigration Court, Jan. 14, 2003) at *15–*16 
(on file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies). 
 
146 Id. at 9. Again note this is not in conformity with the UNHCR approach, which 
holds that the size of the group is irrelevant. UNHCR Guidelines on Particular Social 
Group, supra note 133, at ¶ 18; UNHCR, Gender Guidelines, supra note 64, ¶ 31. 
 
147 The immigration judge did so without examining the second aspect of the 
immutability requirement, which is whether the characteristics were so fundamental to 
human dignity that she ought not to be required to change them. See generally Matter of E S 
N (Kan. City, MO Immigration Court, Jan. 14, 2003) (on file with The Hastings Center for 
Gender & Refugee Studies). 
 
148 Id. at 13. 
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“Cameroonian widows” because the United States government’s own 
country of origin evidence plainly demonstrated that they did share 
common immutable characteristics (gender and the experience of losing a 
husband) and were in fact viewed as a socially distinct group. 
 The British experience is instructive here. In 2005, after an 
exhaustive review of the case law on particular social group and gender, 
the United Kingdom Immigration Appeal Tribunal noted “from experience 
that such cases often appear to become bogged down in pedantic and often 
unnecessary argument as to definition of the particular social group.”
149
 In 
that case, the tribunal took the step of itself formulating the group (as 
“Young Iranian Women who refuse to enter into arranged marriages”), 
holding that this group was defined by its non-conformity rather than the 
persecutory outcome, which followed, and thus presented an acceptable 
basis for the particular social group.
150
 Thus, resistance or opposition to the 
oppression (which is surely implicit in the making of the refugee claim) 
rather than the actual experience of the persecution was centered as the 
basis of group membership. Ironically, this represents a belated acceptance 
of the position first put by UNHCR in 1985,
151
 restated over and over since 
then in various gender guidelines and articulated in the earliest of the 
American gender cases: that the basis of many women’s claim to a 
particular social group will be their non-conformity with prevailing social 
mores.  
 In sum, the American approach to gender-based particular social 
groups proved to be a major barrier to forced marriage claims. This was 
especially due to the rejection of broadly based groups (such as ‘women’) 
because of to the American interpretation of additional requirements that 
the group be “visible,” “particular” and “distinct.” However, narrower 
groups were also in danger of being rejected if the formulation of the group 
was, or was seen to be, too reliant upon the persecution that its members 
experienced or if it was so specific that it was viewed by decision-makers 
as unlikely to be singled out by persecutors or as a “personal” experience 
rather than a group identity. 
 In addition to the fact that American asylum law has consistently 
rejected both broadly and narrowly-framed gendered groups, it is very 
troubling that in the United States the onus is so strongly upon the 
applicants themselves to frame the group, with little or no input or 
guidance from the relevant decision maker. In the American cases 
numerous applicants failed because they did not themselves frame an 
appropriate group, or do not frame it early enough in the process,
152
 even in 
cases where their testimony as to the experience of forced marriage was 
                                                 
149 TB, [2005] UKAIT 00065 ¶ 66(9 Mar. 2005).  
 
150 Id. ¶ 57. Cf. Berishaj v. Gonzalez, 238 F.App’x 57, 62 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(noting that the Immigration Judge rejected petitioner’s claim that she fell under a 
recognizable particular social group constituting of “a woman who is not willing to go 
through a forced marriage” and doubting but not disturbing this ruling); Xiu Yun Chen v. 
Gonzalez, 229 F.App’x 413, 415 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Immigration Judge rejected 
petitioner’s claim that she fell under a recognizable particular social group constituting of 
“young females who are against marrying” and doubting but not disturbing this ruling). 
 
151 See UNHCR, Refugee Women and International Protection supra note 1, at § 
k. 
 
152 See, e.g., Xue Qin Li v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 172 F.App’x 385 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
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accepted as truthful and persecution was established.
153
 This failure is out 
of step with the formulation by decision-makers of gender-based social 
groups concerning marriage in comparable countries. These failures of 
analysis and engagement in the particular social group definition have 
severely retarded American asylum jurisprudence on gender more broadly 
and forced marriage in particular.  
 In order to qualify as a refugee, persecution must be “for reasons 
of” one of the Convention grounds. Failure to properly define the particular 
social group also had flow-on effects in the analysis of the nexus between 
the Convention ground and the persecution, creating an additional doctrinal 
hurdle for claimants. 
 
B. Nexus: Marriage as Entirely Personal, Occasionally Commercial 
and Different in Foreign Places   
 
Marriage was often understood by decision makers as a “cultural” 
or “traditional” experience such that there frequently was not seen to be 
any nexus between claims of forced marriage and a Convention ground.  
 Pressure to marry was sometimes characterized as lacking a nexus 
because it was an experience that affected men also.
154
 More commonly, 
claims were seen as lacking nexus—even when the conduct associated with 
the marriage was accepted as persecutory—because the harm or “dispute” 
was viewed by the decision-maker as “entirely personal.”
155
 For example in 
the 2005 decision of AD, the immigration judge held that, “[T]he abuse the 
respondent suffered resulted solely from her uncle’s desire to punish her 
for disobeying his request [to marry].” The abuse constituted a personal 
retaliation, not an act of persecution directed at a member of a particular 
social group.
156
 
In addition, in some cases the fact that the applicant was opposed 
to marrying a particular individual rather than opposed to arranged 
marriage in general was interpreted by the decision-maker as meaning that 
there was no nexus because the actions of the victim were based on 
personal preference.
157
 
 In three different cases involving the payment of bride prices for 
young Chinese women adjudicated at different levels over a ten-year 
period, courts held that there was no nexus with a Convention ground 
because the marriage “dispute” was characterised as both “purely personal” 
and inherently commercial.  In the 1999 case of SL the immigration judge 
stated: 
                                                 
153 See, e.g., Hua Lin v. Gonzalez, 205 F.App’x 879 (2d Cir. 2006); Berishaj v. 
Gonzalez, 238 F.App’x 57 (6th Cir. 2007); Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 319 F. App’x 777 (11th 
Cir. 2009). 
 
154 See, e.g., In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 303 (BIA 2007) (“family pressures to 
accede to arranged marriages are not necessarily confined to females”), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Attorney Gen. 2008). 
 
155 See, e.g., Matter of S L (N.Y.C., NY Immigration Court, Oct. 7, 1999) at *14, 
aff’d sub nom. (on file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies); Shu Lin v. 
Gonzalez, 148 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 
156 Matter of A-D-A (Bos., MA Immigration Court, Sept. 19, 2005) at *13 (on file 
with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies). 
 
157 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 app.. C at *20 
(2007) (No. 06-1264); Syed v. Mukasey, 288 F. App’x 273 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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In this case, we have one party, the mayor, who wants to 
enforce the terms of a valid contract; while the other side, the 
respondent and her family, wants to void the terms of the 
contract. This case would be better litigated in civil court rather 
than Immigration Court. If respondent’s family was persecuted 
after she left, it was because they breached the terms of the 
contract and not because of the mayor’s intention to punish 
them for one of the five enumerated [Convention] grounds in 
the Act.
158
 
 
This decision was summarily affirmed by the BIA and again on 
judicial review by the Second Circuit in 2005.
159
  
 In 2003, in the oral decision delivered in Gao the immigration 
judge repeatedly characterised the issue as a “dispute between two 
families” over a “marriage arrangement” and as “some kind of a 
contract,”
160
 concluding that, “[H]er mother violated the oral contract that 
she had with this go-between, and that is what caused the anger by the 
boyfriend in this situation and not political opinion or a particular social 
group membership.”
161
 
This decision was summarily affirmed by the BIA. On appeal in 
2006, the Second Circuit responded: 
 
To the extent that the Immigration Judge might have reasoned 
that the financial arrangement between the families somehow 
precluded a finding that Zhi’s motive in targeting Gao was 
discriminatory, we reject this logic as antithetical to the very 
notion of individual rights on which asylum law is based. 
While Zhi may have a legitimate financial claim against Gao’s 
parents, the possibility remains that if they continue to be 
unable to repay his money, Zhi will force Gao to marry him.
162
 
 
Because the Second Circuit decision was vacated by the Supreme 
Court in 2007 on other grounds, this statement is left as obiter dicta only. 
Instead the more recent judicial authority from the Eleventh Circuit 
approves the “valid contract” approach to vitiating nexus. In this third and 
most recent case, Ying Lin, an Immigration Judge in 2006 accepted an 
applicant’s claims that her parents promised her in marriage to a man who 
claimed her as payment for a gambling debt owed to him, yet went on to 
dismiss the harm experienced as “entirely a personal matter” between her 
family and the intended groom.
163
 The BIA adopted and affirmed the 
Immigration Judge’s decision in 2008. In 2009 the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the decision and held that: 
                                                 
158 Matter of S L (N.Y.C., NY Immigration Court, Oct. 7, 1999) at *13–*14 
(emphasis added) (on file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies). The 
Immigration Judge also refers to “fearing retribution over purely personal matters.” Id. 
 
159 Shu Lin v. Gonzalez, 148 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 
160 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler, 552 U.S. 801, app. C at *24a (No. 06-
1264). 
 
161 Id. at *25a (emphasis added). 
 
162 Gao v. Gonzalez, 440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). 
 
163 Ying Lin v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 319 F.App’x 777, 779 (11th Cir. 2009). 
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[A]nexus did not exist between the attempted involuntary 
marriage and rape and a protected ground, in that the testimony 
Lin gave did not show that she had been targeted on account of 
her membership in a particular social group. The involuntary 
marriage was for no reason other than repayment of her 
mother’s gambling debt.
164
 
 
It is significant here that the court did not see any nexus between a 
young woman being in a socially vulnerable position and her being treated 
by all parties as a form of payment. Unfortunately it appears that, despite 
the Second Circuit’s efforts, this profound failure of analysis continues in 
American case law. It is striking that domestic discourse in the United 
States on human trafficking does not appear to have any impact upon the 
understanding of this issue in the asylum context. 
 It is notable that, although in the international data set decision 
makers did at times regard marriage as “universal” or see abuse at the 
hands of family members as “personal”, and thus failed to find a nexus 
with the particular social group in women’s claims, such findings were far 
more common in the American cases. Furthermore, in the international 
data set decision makers never suggested in cases concerning a bride price 
or levirate marriage cases that what was at stake represented a valid 
contract, nor did they ever suggest that women could or should avoid 
persecution by repayment of such price, as discussed below. 
 In addition, American asylum law appears to be stunted by an 
undue focus on the central motives of the persecutor in “singling out” the 
applicant when analyzing the question of nexus between persecution and 
the Convention ground.
165
 This is out of step with international and 
UNHCR approaches to nexus, which stress that nexus can be satisfied 
either by the motives for the singling out by the persecutor or by the basis 
upon which there was a failure of state protection.
166
 That is, a “purely 
personal” attack by a non-state actor upon a woman who refuses to marry 
should still satisfy the nexus requirement if the basis of the failure of state 
protection was the government’s disinterest in protecting women from 
domestic or familial violence. In the international data set this dual nexus 
was well accepted. 
 
C. Persecution  
In 2006 the Second Circuit made arguably the strongest judicial 
pronouncement on forced marriage when it stated that “[Gao] might well 
be persecuted in China—in the form of lifelong involuntary marriage.”
167
 
Because this decision was vacated (although on another basis), American 
                                                 
164 Id. at 781–82 (emphasis added). 
 
165 See, e.g., Syed v. Mukasey, 288 F.App’x 273 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 
166 See UNHCR, Guidelines on Particular Social Group, supra note 133, ¶ 23; 
UNHCR, Gender Guidelines, supra note 64, ¶21. See also Min. for Immigration  v. 
Khawar, (2002) 210 C.L.R 1 (Austl.); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [1999] 2 
A.C. 629 (U.K.). 
 
167 Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2006).  
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courts since have continued to regard the question of whether forced 
marriage constitutes persecution as “an open issue.”
168
  
 Although an unwanted marriage was often articulated by claimants 
as either an integral aspect of another feared harm such as FGM or as an 
independent basis of the claim, in American case law it was infrequently 
received as either one.  Applicants’ assertions of forced marriage were not 
infrequently reframed in decisions as “arranged” marriage,
169
 and 
expressed as “unwanted,”
170
 with persecutors restyled as “suitors”
171
 and 
their threats as “proposals.”
172
 As with the particular social group issue, 
one of the most alarming trends in the American cases was the complete 
failure to offer any analysis at all for the conclusion that forced marriage 
was not persecutory.
173
  
 In cases involving a bride price or widow’s dowry, it was striking 
how often the decision maker placed the onus upon the applicant to repay 
the sum (including extremely large sums, funds that were paid to others 
and sums paid many years earlier) in order to avoid persecutory 
consequences.
174
 For example, in the 2003 case of Ngengwe discussed 
earlier, where the applicant faced forced levirate marriage or repayment of 
her original dowry, the immigration judge suggested that since she had 
been in the United States for twenty months she, “Could send money to her 
in-law’s family if she chose to do so to pay back any money that they view 
is owed... but she has made no attempt to alleviate the threat of future harm 
by paying back to them the ‘bride’s price’.”
175
 
                                                 
168 Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 
169 See, e.g., In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 297, 302 (BIA 2007), remanded on 
other grounds sub nom. In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Attorney Gen. 2008); Matter of 
Anon (Buffalo, NY Immigration Court, Dec. 14, 1999) (on file with The Hastings Center 
for Gender & Refugee Studies). See also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at *12, Keisler v. 
Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007) (No. 06-1264) (referring to the particular social group as “women 
in arranged marriages.”). 
 
170 Yan Hua Lin v. Gonzales, 246 F.App’x 746, 748–49 (2d Cir. 2007). 
  
171 Id.; Matter of Anon (Chi., IL Immigration Court, Oct. 18, 2000) at *2, *7 (but 
note that this was a positive decision) (on file with The Hastings Center for Gender & 
Refugee Studies). 
 
172 Xiu Yun Chen v. Gonzalez, 229 F.App’x 413 (7th Cir. 2007); Matter of A-D-
A (Bos., MA Immigration Court, Sept. 19, 2005) at *4 (on file with The Hastings Center for 
Gender & Refugee Studies). In a related tone, see the use of forced marriage in disclaiming 
inverted commas in Keita v. Gonzalez, 2006 U,S, App. LEXIS 9484, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 
13, 2006); Matter of E S N (Kan. City, MO Immigration Court, Jan. 14, 2003) at *10 (on 
file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies). 
 
173 In only one appellate level decision we identified did the Court of Appeals find 
legal error and remand a case to the BIA for failing to consider the claim of forced marriage 
in its reasons. Notably, in that case the issue was whether the threat of forced marriage 
constituted a changed circumstance (justifying an out of time claim) rather than whether it 
constituted persecution per se.  Joseph v. Gonzales, 240 F.App’x 726 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 
174 See the three Chinese contract cases discussed above. See also Jin Chao Zheng 
v. Gonzales, 236 F.App’x 726, 727 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding no nexus when an official 
offered to waive a fine levied at the applicant’s parents if she would marry his son because 
she “did not claim that her parents were unwilling to pay the fine, just that they could not 
afford to do so”). 
 
175 Matter of E S N (Kan. City, MO Immigration Court, Jan. 14, 2003) at *17 (on 
file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies); see also id. at 18 (“she 
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 Although summarily affirmed by the BIA, in 2008 the Eighth 
Circuit remitted this issue for reconsideration on the basis that the “IJ 
offered no analysis, and cited no law, on why the choice between forced 
marriage, death, or paying an unaffordable bride’s price does not constitute 
persecution.”
176
 
 The case of A-T in 2007 is a particularly disturbing example of the 
failure to understand forced marriage as a form of persecution. In that case 
the BIA stated: 
 
It appears from the record that the respondent and her intended 
fiancé are of similar ages and backgrounds, given the 
respondent’s testimony that she and her cousin played together 
as children, and that the family used to joke that they would 
one day marry. Thus, if the respondent were to return to Mali 
and proceed with the marriage, it is not likely that she would 
be in a disadvantaged position in relation to her husband on 
account of her age or economic status.  
 
It is understandable that the respondent, an educated young 
woman, would prefer to choose her own spouse rather than 
acquiesce to pressure from her family to marry someone she 
does not love and with whom she expects to be unhappy. The 
respondent has also expressed valid concerns about possible 
birth defects resulting from a union with her first cousin. While 
we do not discount the respondent’s concerns, we do not see 
how the reluctant acceptance of family tradition over personal 
preference can form the basis for a withholding of removal 
claim.
177
 
 
This first paragraph suggests that a forced marriage will only be 
harmful if there is a significant age or economic difference in the parties’ 
relative positions, rather than constituting a human rights violation in and 
of itself.  Somewhat ironically, given that such claims have been mostly 
unsuccessful in the United States, it also implicitly suggests the payment of 
a bride price for a young woman by an older man is the paradigmatic 
example of forced marriage. It is also noteworthy that in the second 
paragraph, being forced to marry is transformed into “acquiescence” and 
“reluctant submission,” suggesting that actual consent is not necessarily 
required.  
 While the decision was vacated and remanded by the Attorney-
General in 2008, this was on the basis of a failure to consider the 
relationship between past FGM and any future harm. The question of 
forced marriage was addressed merely in a footnote to the decision, which 
noted that the Board had appeared to make contradictory findings on 
whether the forced marriage and FGM were related and left this “for the 
Board to revisit or clarify on remand as needed.”
178
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 What has been completely lost in the cases discussed above is the 
basic tenet that a forced marriage is persecutory because it breaches the 
fundamental human right to full and free consent in marriage. Yet, freedom 
to marry the partner of one’s choosing has been repeatedly acknowledged 
as fundamental to human dignity in domestic constitutional litigation in the 
United States. While historically such challenges were to prohibitions on 
interracial marriage, more recently they have addressed same-sex 
marriage.
179
 Regardless of whether legislative restrictions on marriage have 
been struck down or upheld, decisions in such cases have emphatically 
propounded the importance of marriage as both an individual right and as a 
voluntary social institution that fosters wider harmony and social 
stability.
180
 A contemporary Western ideal of marriage as romantic, 
egalitarian and companionate (as opposed to, say, dutiful, self-sacrificing 
or asymmetrical in power) is strongly present in such domestic case law 
and is never trivialized, as it was in In re A-T, as mere “personal 
preference.”  
 In Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, a majority judgment of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court declared that the state of marriage “nurtures 
love and mutual support” and is “at once a deeply personal commitment to 
another human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of 
mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity and family.”
181
 That judgment 
also characterized marriage as crucial to the formation of self-identity and 
to individual self-fulfilment, claiming inter alia that, “[w]ithout the right to 
marry—or more properly, the right to choose to marry—one is excluded 
from the full range of human experience”
182
 and “the decision whether and 
whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”
183
 The 
ideas of marriage expressed in such cases—as the unique fulfilment of self-
hood in a state of loving unity, and as an expression of human dignity 
fundamental to human rights—are conspicuous by their resounding 
absence in refugee cases concerning forced marriage where decision 
makers rarely, if ever, articulated coerced marriage (and concomitant 
inability to also choose to enter into a voluntary marriage with someone 
else) as a persecutory harm.  
 
IV. WHO WINS? THE SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS  
Despite the persistent doctrinal hurdles in applying refugee law 
principles to forced marriage cases as explored above, some of the 
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decisions in our data set were positive.  As noted earlier, at the broadest 
level the rate of positive decisions in the United States was comparable 
with the international data set.
184
 We gathered together the positive 
American decisions to analyze the key elements of a successful claim.  The 
results of this analysis are disappointing. There were fifteen positive 
decisions in the United States portion of our data set. We counted 
“positive” decisions as those in which the outcome was what the claimant 
sought at that stage.  Of the fifteen positive decisions, eleven were judicial 
review decisions by appellate courts. This means that a “positive” case was 
often merely a remittal for redetermination of the claim rather than an 
actual grant of asylum.  Furthermore, as many of the positive outcomes 
occurred at the appellate level on judicial review there is often little 
information about the factual background to the decision.   
 The characteristics of successful claims varied considerably. The 
fifteen claimants came from nine different countries, with China as the 
only country of origin with more than one successful claimant.
185
 The high 
number of claimants from China is likely not indicative of a greater 
openness to these claims, but instead reflects the high number of asylum 
applicants each year from China as well as the considerable evidence that 
forced marriage is an important human rights issue in China and the 
specific statutory recognition of forced abortion and sterilization can 
constitute persecution in US law.
186
  
 Of the positive decisions, Gao, discussed above, was later 
overturned by the Supreme Court.  Prior to the Supreme Court decision in 
Gao, the Second Circuit issued a small series of three positive decisions 
relying on its original Gao reasoning.
187
 The Second Circuit has not issued 
another positive decision following the Supreme Court decision, despite 
the fact that the decision did not actually rule out the possibility of finding 
a particular social group or persecution in the context of forced marriage.
188
   
 In four of the positive decisions, including Kasinga, forced 
marriage was not mentioned in the analysis at all, only in the facts.
189
 In a 
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further two decisions forced marriage appears only as an incidental factor 
related to FGM.
190
 Excluding the positive cases where the claim of forced 
marriage is not mentioned in the decision, cases which were analyzed only 
as FGM claims, and the four cases belonging to the Gao gap (including 
Gao itself), as well as one case in which the forced marriage argument was 
found not credible but a positive decision was granted on another 
ground,
191
 a mere four positive decisions remain.  In short, counting 15 of 
our 48 decisions as positive vastly over-represents the chance of ‘success’ 
for forced marriage refugee claimants.   
 The singularly most striking factor in the positive American cases 
is that forced marriage was in itself never found to be a form of persecution 
in any decision. While only four decisions in the international data set 
contained a strong analysis of forced marriage alone as a form of 
persecution of a vulnerable group, none of the successful American 
decisions did so.
192
 This is directly at odds with international human rights 
standards and with all guidelines—including the INS Gender Guidelines—
on gender-related persecution.   
 In the international data set, we found that positive claims were 
most often related to factors additional to the forced marriage itself.  This 
“something more” was sometimes an understanding that forced marriage 
would constitute a catalyst for other harm such as domestic or sexual 
violence or FGM. In claims brought by gay men, forced marriage was 
often considered one way that their sexual orientation might become 
known, and therefore would lead to persecution for that reason.  While 
such cases did not center forced marriage in itself as persecution, they at 
least recognized the linkages between forced marriage and other forms of 
gendered harms and harms related to sexuality.
193
   
 Like many of the positive decisions in the international data set, 
the US positive decisions generally involved ‘something more’ beyond the 
marriage itself, and that this ‘something more’ is profoundly ‘other’ to the 
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experience of a Western decision maker.  The most recent of these is 
Ngengwe, which involved the culturally distant practice of levirate 
marriage.
194
 Likewise, in the 2007 Joseph decision, a woman from Pakistan 
feared a forcible marriage on return and presented a narrative which 
included violent attacks by her family and a history of so-called “honor 
killings.”
195
 These cases all fit into the pattern of “othering” or 
“exoticizing” women refugee claimants, presenting them as victims of 
distant and backwards “traditional” cultural practices.  
 The tendency to exoticize gender claims is now well 
documented,
196
 and FGM cases are the clearest example of this pattern.
197
 
Indeed, even when the claimants explicitly linked their experience of FGM 
to forced marriage, decision makers did not.
198
 Furthermore, in the 
American cases, the practices of FGM are described in extraordinary, 
almost prurient, detail.  This is a striking distinction in comparison with the 
cases involving FGM we reviewed from Australia, Canada and the United 
Kingdom, and it adds considerably to the exoticization and othering of the 
claimants. It was striking that the American cases did not ever analyze 
forced marriage as a catalyst for other forms of forms of gendered harm; 
this was so even when claims of FGM were closely linked to marriage. 
 Of the substantively positive decisions, two were written prior to 
2001 when the combined effect of legislative and administrative changes in 
the wake of the 9/11 attacks brought substantive changes to American law 
in a much harsher climate for refugee claims.
199
 It is remarkable that the 
oldest positive American decision in our data set, from 1994,  comes 
closest to defying an exoticizing pattern.
200
 The claim was brought by an 
Iranian woman from a politically dissident family who faced coercion to 
marry a disabled Iranian war veteran following the arrest and 
disappearance of her husband.
201
 This decision of the Ninth Circuit 
contains a strong statement that forcible marriage constitutes persecution in 
certain circumstances: “There can be no doubt that a government that 
coerces a woman to marry against her will on account of imputed political 
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opinion has engaged in persecution.”
202
 While there were many factors 
besides forced marriage involved in the case, the court engaged in 
markedly less exoticising than is typical. Given our earlier discussion of 
the myriad of problems in establishing particular social group parameters 
in gender claims, it is worth noting that the strong analysis of forced 
marriage as persecution in this case was not made on the basis of a 
gendered particular social group but rather rested upon the political opinion 
ground.
203
  
 In the international data set we found an understanding of “force” 
in forced marriage that rested upon proxies for consent such as the level of 
education, age, urbanity or “independence” of the applicant (with 
independence itself represented by the proxies of income and 
unaccompanied travel). Being educated, over the usual marriageable age 
for the country of origin, residing in an urban rather than a rural area or 
exhibiting “independence” through employment or past travel without 
parental supervision were frequently taken to mean that female applicants 
were not “disempowered” and thus could refuse marriage (and could also 
therefore relocate away from any persecution or seek state protection).
204
 
The approach of United States’ decision makers to understanding consent 
was even narrower. In the American cases, proxies for consent comprised 
only two factors: payment to another for the marriage and being a child. 
For instance Gao, and the Second Circuit trio of cases decided in the “Gao 
gap”
205
 (plus an earlier positive immigration judge decision concerning an 
applicant from China) all involved the claimant being “sold” into marriage 
as a minor or young woman through payment to family members or third 
parties. In this way, the understanding of “force” in forced marriage 
refugee claims came to resemble the very limited discourse around forced 
marriage in American domestic politics, as concerning only child marriage 
and human trafficking.
206
 
 Our canvass of the positive cases reinforces our conclusion that the 
United States’ decision makers are far behind those in Australia, Canada 
and the United Kingdom in terms of analyzing gender-related persecution. 
In addition to not finding a single case with a straightforward holding that 
forced marriage in and of itself could constitute persecution, we also did 
not find any engagement with international human rights standards. Of the 
few cases that were successful on a substantive basis, we found that the 
underlying facts reflect an extreme exoticization of the women involved.  It 
is also astonishing that we found no gay men or lesbians among American 
claimants, as they comprised a significant portion of our international data 
set (with reasonably high success rates). Our conclusions about substantive 
analysis in the United States cases are particularly distressing given that the 
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procedural hurdles for claimants are far more onerous in the United States 
than in Australia, Canada or the United Kingdom. Even if one is able to 
surmount those hurdles, a claim that forcible marriage is a form of 
persecution related to gender and sexuality appears to have little chance of 
success in the United States. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
In March 2009, Reem Al Numery of Yemen was recognized by 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as one of eight “International Women of 
Courage.”
207
 Along with women from Afghanistan, Guatemala, Iraq, 
Malaysia, Niger, Russia and Uzbekistan, she was recognized for “courage 
and leadership” in the struggle for “social justice and human rights.”
208
 
Reem received this honour because of her fight against her own forced 
marriage to a thirty-year old cousin when she was twelve years old.
209
   
Bestowing this honour on Reem recognizes her as an individual, as 
well as the circumstances of others like her—of the vulnerable group of 
which she is a member.  Yet, this recognition at the highest level of politics 
and policy does not carry into asylum law. This finding parallels and 
amplifies what we found in Britain, where a multilayered and highly 
nuanced domestic debate about forced marriage largely failed to influence 
refugee jurisprudence.  In the United States the disjuncture between 
domestic policy and asylum jurisprudence was even starker.  
 We found that despite the development of gender guidance by the 
INS some fourteen years ago and despite ongoing commitment to training 
around gender issues, there was a profound reluctance to accept any form 
of broadly based gender group in asylum law, accompanied by 
marginalization of all but the most extreme and exoticized forms of 
gender-related harm (such as FGM). Although the issues of child marriage 
and human trafficking have received considerable and increasing domestic 
attention in the United States, even these forms of forced marriage were 
rarely understood as persecutory harm in the United States’ asylum cases.  
 Our findings reflect the uneasy relationship between refugee law 
and human rights law.  Refugee law has not been able to fully embrace 
human rights norms and unfolds against a floodgates fear, a persistent 
cultural relativism and, in the United States more than any other country 
we studied, a foreign policy ethos of exoticized harm elsewhere.    
 In the case of Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Court said of 
marriage that it “fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection 
that express our common humanity.”
210
 This description could as readily be 
used to express the loftiest ideals of refugee law. Yet, when forced 
marriage is claimed as harm in the refugee context, the notion of our 
common humanity is unrecognizable. We began our investigation of forced 
marriage as a basis of persecution because of our interest in exploring the 
ways that gender and sexuality are understood in refugee law, expecting to 
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find that analysis of these issues would have developed and become more 
complex in recent years. It became evident through this study that refugee 
jurisprudence in the United States is substantively impoverished as well as 
procedurally hobbled, and the protection that it offers falls well short of 
international standards and respect for our common humanity. 
